In September 1862, Confederate General Robert E. Lee moved the Army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac River into Maryland. His reasons for this were; a recent series of smashing victories against the Union armies in Virginia, the hope to continue the momentum of these victories and influence the upcoming November elections thereby bringing a close to the war, potential recognition of the Confederacy by England and France, liberation of Maryland so the state could secede into the Confederacy, and finding desperately needed food and materials for his army. Lee’s move across the Potomac resulted in the 1862 Maryland Campaign during September 2-20 with a series of skirmishes and three major battles; South Mountain September 14, Antietam September 17, and Shepherdstown September 20. This study will focus on how geography affected the initial troop movements throughout September 9-15 and, more specifically, at the Battle of South Mountain.
The Confederate Situation:
In order to understand why the Battle of South Mountain occurred, a look at Lee’s Special Orders #191 is required. Lee believed the Union garrisons in the Shenandoah Valley (Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg) could be captured before the Army of the Potomac caught up with the Confederates. As a result, Lee wrote these orders on September 9 at the Best Farm along the Monocacy River operating under this assumption—-
1. The citizens of Fredericktown being unwilling while overrun by members of this army, to open their stores, in order to give them confidence, and to secure to officers and men purchasing supplies for benefit of this command, all officers and men of this army are strictly prohibited from visiting Fredericktown except on business, in which cases they will bear evidence of this in writing from division commanders. The provost-marshal in Fredericktown will see that his guard rigidly enforces this order.
2. Major Taylor will proceed to Leesburg, Virginia, and arrange for transportation of the sick and those unable to walk to Winchester, securing the transportation of the country for this purpose. The route between this and Culpepper Court-House east of the mountains being unsafe, will no longer be traveled. Those on the way to this army already across the river will move up promptly; all others will proceed to Winchester collectively and under command of officers, at which point, being the general depot of this army, its movements will be known and instructions given by commanding officer regulating further movements.
3. The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harpers Ferry.
4. General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.
5. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harpers Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harpers Ferry and vicinity.
The Confederate Situation:
In order to understand why the Battle of South Mountain occurred, a look at Lee’s Special Orders #191 is required. Lee believed the Union garrisons in the Shenandoah Valley (Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg) could be captured before the Army of the Potomac caught up with the Confederates. As a result, Lee wrote these orders on September 9 at the Best Farm along the Monocacy River operating under this assumption—-
1. The citizens of Fredericktown being unwilling while overrun by members of this army, to open their stores, in order to give them confidence, and to secure to officers and men purchasing supplies for benefit of this command, all officers and men of this army are strictly prohibited from visiting Fredericktown except on business, in which cases they will bear evidence of this in writing from division commanders. The provost-marshal in Fredericktown will see that his guard rigidly enforces this order.
2. Major Taylor will proceed to Leesburg, Virginia, and arrange for transportation of the sick and those unable to walk to Winchester, securing the transportation of the country for this purpose. The route between this and Culpepper Court-House east of the mountains being unsafe, will no longer be traveled. Those on the way to this army already across the river will move up promptly; all others will proceed to Winchester collectively and under command of officers, at which point, being the general depot of this army, its movements will be known and instructions given by commanding officer regulating further movements.
3. The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harpers Ferry.
4. General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.
5. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harpers Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harpers Ferry and vicinity.
6. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with General McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.
7. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.
8. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.
9. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.
10. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance-wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood &c.
By command of General R. E. Lee
R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General
Essentially, Lee was dividing his force in three, each with a specific goal. Major General T.J. “Stonewall” Jackson was ordered to capture the Federal garrisons in the Shenandoah Valley. Major General James Longstreet was to march to Boonsboro but would eventually proceed to Hagerstown with a potential thrust into Pennsylvania. Major General Lafayette McLaws was to reinforce Maryland Heights to aid Jackson with capture of Harpers Ferry. General John G. Walker was also to assist Jackson from Loudoun Heights. Major General D.H. Hill was to act as the rear guard of the main army and although he was given no specific destination, Hill went as far west as Boonsboro. Major General J.E.B Stuart was to provide a cavalry screen for all Confederate movements. With the fall of Harpers Ferry, Jackson, McLaws and Walker were then to rejoin the main army with Lee, Longstreet, and Hill either at Boonsboro or Hagerstown. The Confederates were set to begin movement on September 10.
By 4AM, the Confederates began moving out of Frederick. Jackson took the lead and followed the National Turnpike until he reached Boonsboro after passing through Turner’s Gap. Part of his division remained on the eastern side of South Mountain camped along Old Sharpsburg Road. Longstreet followed Jackson along the National Turnpike and camped two miles west of Middletown. McLaws left last and also followed along the National Turnpike until he reached Middletown where he turned and headed to Burkittsville where he camped at the base of South Mountain near Brownsville Pass.
7. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.
8. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.
9. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.
10. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance-wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood &c.
By command of General R. E. Lee
R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General
Essentially, Lee was dividing his force in three, each with a specific goal. Major General T.J. “Stonewall” Jackson was ordered to capture the Federal garrisons in the Shenandoah Valley. Major General James Longstreet was to march to Boonsboro but would eventually proceed to Hagerstown with a potential thrust into Pennsylvania. Major General Lafayette McLaws was to reinforce Maryland Heights to aid Jackson with capture of Harpers Ferry. General John G. Walker was also to assist Jackson from Loudoun Heights. Major General D.H. Hill was to act as the rear guard of the main army and although he was given no specific destination, Hill went as far west as Boonsboro. Major General J.E.B Stuart was to provide a cavalry screen for all Confederate movements. With the fall of Harpers Ferry, Jackson, McLaws and Walker were then to rejoin the main army with Lee, Longstreet, and Hill either at Boonsboro or Hagerstown. The Confederates were set to begin movement on September 10.
By 4AM, the Confederates began moving out of Frederick. Jackson took the lead and followed the National Turnpike until he reached Boonsboro after passing through Turner’s Gap. Part of his division remained on the eastern side of South Mountain camped along Old Sharpsburg Road. Longstreet followed Jackson along the National Turnpike and camped two miles west of Middletown. McLaws left last and also followed along the National Turnpike until he reached Middletown where he turned and headed to Burkittsville where he camped at the base of South Mountain near Brownsville Pass.
On September 11, Jackson continued his march to Williamsport. Longstreet’s division crossed Turner’s Gap and waited at Boonsboro for the others to fulfill their assignments and return to Boonsboro to reunite the divided Confederate army. However, Lee urged Longstreet forward to Hagerstown while leaving only Hill’s division at Boonsboro. Hill did not make it to Boonsboro, being the last to leave Frederick, he only advanced a few miles outside of Frederick on September 10 and finally reached a point two miles east of Turner’s Gap on September 11. McLaws advanced through Brownsville Pass to the edge of Pleasant Valley. The army was now stretched even thinner over a wider distance and taking a longer time to achieve its objectives than Lee had planned.
On September 12, Longstreet arrived in Hagerstown. The Union evacuated the Martinsburg garrison and fled to Harpers Ferry as Jackson pursued. McLaws continued to occupy Maryland Heights while leaving Brigadier Generals Paul J. Semmes and William Mahone to guard the passes at Crampton and Brownsville. Hill crossed Turner’s Gap but did not stop at Boonsboro, he continued north on the National Turnpike with his headquarters four miles west of Boonsboro. His division was widely scattered watching various roads for Union escapees from the garrisons and no force was left to guard Turner’s Gap or Boonsboro from the east.
On September 13, Lee became anxious. He received reports his plan was not on schedule and the Union was moving towards Frederick and South Mountain much more rapidly than expected. In fact, he was completely unaware that the Union army was already in Frederick and the Union cavalry was operating in Middletown. Furthermore, he was not fully informed of the locations of his divided army or the danger that was becoming more present. Jackson was still not at Harpers Ferry, Lee had no idea where Stuart was, Hill was only one or two miles west of Boonsboro (rather than four). Nonetheless, Lee's primary concern was capturing Harpers Ferry and reuniting his army, not the growing Union menace making its way to the east side of South Mountain.
The Union Situation:
By September 13, Major General Geogre B. McClellan reached Frederick. He was attempting to decipher what Lee’s target was; Baltimore, Pennsylvania or Harpers Ferry when a
On September 12, Longstreet arrived in Hagerstown. The Union evacuated the Martinsburg garrison and fled to Harpers Ferry as Jackson pursued. McLaws continued to occupy Maryland Heights while leaving Brigadier Generals Paul J. Semmes and William Mahone to guard the passes at Crampton and Brownsville. Hill crossed Turner’s Gap but did not stop at Boonsboro, he continued north on the National Turnpike with his headquarters four miles west of Boonsboro. His division was widely scattered watching various roads for Union escapees from the garrisons and no force was left to guard Turner’s Gap or Boonsboro from the east.
On September 13, Lee became anxious. He received reports his plan was not on schedule and the Union was moving towards Frederick and South Mountain much more rapidly than expected. In fact, he was completely unaware that the Union army was already in Frederick and the Union cavalry was operating in Middletown. Furthermore, he was not fully informed of the locations of his divided army or the danger that was becoming more present. Jackson was still not at Harpers Ferry, Lee had no idea where Stuart was, Hill was only one or two miles west of Boonsboro (rather than four). Nonetheless, Lee's primary concern was capturing Harpers Ferry and reuniting his army, not the growing Union menace making its way to the east side of South Mountain.
The Union Situation:
By September 13, Major General Geogre B. McClellan reached Frederick. He was attempting to decipher what Lee’s target was; Baltimore, Pennsylvania or Harpers Ferry when a
copy of Special Orders #191 was found in a field. Once McClellan received the Lost Orders, he knew what Lee’s plans were, he just didn’t know the current locations of Lee’s divided army. However, he knew he had to relieve Harpers Ferry and attack at Boonsboro. McClellan decided his route of a two-pronged attack would take Crampton’s and Turner’s Gaps. That evening he issued orders for the movement of the Union army to occur the next morning. The bulk of the army would focus on Boonsboro where McClellan believed the majority of the Confederate army was located with Lee. They would march at dawn on the National Turnpike to Turner’s Gap. Major General William B. Franklin (with Major General Darius Couch to follow behind shortly) would focus on passing through Crampton’s Gap and isolating McLaws. Franklin’s sunrise route was through Jefferson to Burkittsville and through Crampton’s Gap.
September 14 Crampton’s Gap:
On September 14 at 5:30AM, Franklin’s 6th Corps began its march on the Jefferson-Burkittsville Road. The 6th Corps reached Jefferson around 8AM and halted until 10:30AM to let Couch catch up. Couch never did arrive so Franklin ordered the march to continue to Burkittsville.
Union cavalry accompanying Colonel Henry Cake’s 96th PA made contact with the Confederates about two miles east of Burkittsville around 12PM. In response, Cake formed a skirmish line one mile closer to the town and pushed forward. Finding a farm road (Distillery Lane) leading southwest, Company A followed it to a sawmill where they took cover. Company F continued towards Burkittsville along Main Street. The rest of the regiment filled in on the farm road. A short time later, the rest of Major General Henry Slocum’s division arrived and rested in a field where they found cover in a grove of woods. Franklin and Major General William F. Smith joined Slocum at the edge of the grove situated on the farm of Martin T. Shafer and set up headquarters. This location gave Franklin a commanding view of the valley to South Mountain.
Franklin ordered Cake to ascertain the enemy’s strength. Cake moved his regiment from Distillery Lane, across the street into a field where he met artillery fire from two guns at Crampton and three from Brownsville. Cake returned his regiment to the road for shelter.
September 14 Crampton’s Gap:
On September 14 at 5:30AM, Franklin’s 6th Corps began its march on the Jefferson-Burkittsville Road. The 6th Corps reached Jefferson around 8AM and halted until 10:30AM to let Couch catch up. Couch never did arrive so Franklin ordered the march to continue to Burkittsville.
Union cavalry accompanying Colonel Henry Cake’s 96th PA made contact with the Confederates about two miles east of Burkittsville around 12PM. In response, Cake formed a skirmish line one mile closer to the town and pushed forward. Finding a farm road (Distillery Lane) leading southwest, Company A followed it to a sawmill where they took cover. Company F continued towards Burkittsville along Main Street. The rest of the regiment filled in on the farm road. A short time later, the rest of Major General Henry Slocum’s division arrived and rested in a field where they found cover in a grove of woods. Franklin and Major General William F. Smith joined Slocum at the edge of the grove situated on the farm of Martin T. Shafer and set up headquarters. This location gave Franklin a commanding view of the valley to South Mountain.
Franklin ordered Cake to ascertain the enemy’s strength. Cake moved his regiment from Distillery Lane, across the street into a field where he met artillery fire from two guns at Crampton and three from Brownsville. Cake returned his regiment to the road for shelter.
A plan of attack was formed at the Shafer house. Due to the terrain, this would be an infantry battle. Colonel Joseph J. Bartlett was chosen to lead the attack and consulted as to what side of the Burkittsville-Jefferson Road he thought best to advance. He responded on the right, or north of the road. Bartlett wanted to have a narrow front with great depth therefore placing two brigades next to each other with the rest of the brigades to follow at intervals of 100-200 yards behind each. Slocum’s division consisted of 3 brigades of 12 regiments (5500 men), with the 27th NY acting as the skirmish line, advancing directly towards Crampton’s Gap. A deep ravine would screen the initial movement as the troops moved towards the northwest base of the mountain to then form an attack to take the crest of the mountain. Brigadier General W.T.H. Brooks would operate on the left in order to create a diversion as Bartlett’s main attack hit the right.
Although the plan seemed easy enough, this would be no simple task due to the terrain and road network that favored the Confederates. The ground to Crampton’s Gap was open, rolling farmland intersected with numerous stone walls and rail fences to the base of the mountain. At the base of the mountain was Mountain Church Road lined with a stone wall. Behind the stone wall, the mountain sharply jutted up to 1200 feet at its highest point and was heavily wooded. The south end of Mountain Church Road joined with Burkittsville Road. This portion of the road was wooded and rocky on both sides and marked the western end of the town. Burkittsville Road ran up the mountain in a steep northeast grade to the summit where it met Arnoldstown Road that led back down the mountain to join with Mountain Church Road. The distance between Burkittsville and Arnoldstown Roads junctions with Mountain Church Road was approximately one mile. At the summit, two roads ran down the west side of the mountain. One leading northwest to Rohrersville (Townsend Road) and the other southwest to Brownsville-Rohrersville Road (Gapland Road).
Around 3:30PM, the Union troops poured out of two ravines, Manor and Burkitts Runs, about 1000 yards from the base of South Mountain and into an open field. The ravines were small waterways cut into the earth over time and provided the cover that Bartlett needed to advance the troops in secret. It was two miles from the Shafer farm to the open field. The division stretched one mile and it took one hour to march the two miles. Once out of the ravine,
Although the plan seemed easy enough, this would be no simple task due to the terrain and road network that favored the Confederates. The ground to Crampton’s Gap was open, rolling farmland intersected with numerous stone walls and rail fences to the base of the mountain. At the base of the mountain was Mountain Church Road lined with a stone wall. Behind the stone wall, the mountain sharply jutted up to 1200 feet at its highest point and was heavily wooded. The south end of Mountain Church Road joined with Burkittsville Road. This portion of the road was wooded and rocky on both sides and marked the western end of the town. Burkittsville Road ran up the mountain in a steep northeast grade to the summit where it met Arnoldstown Road that led back down the mountain to join with Mountain Church Road. The distance between Burkittsville and Arnoldstown Roads junctions with Mountain Church Road was approximately one mile. At the summit, two roads ran down the west side of the mountain. One leading northwest to Rohrersville (Townsend Road) and the other southwest to Brownsville-Rohrersville Road (Gapland Road).
Around 3:30PM, the Union troops poured out of two ravines, Manor and Burkitts Runs, about 1000 yards from the base of South Mountain and into an open field. The ravines were small waterways cut into the earth over time and provided the cover that Bartlett needed to advance the troops in secret. It was two miles from the Shafer farm to the open field. The division stretched one mile and it took one hour to march the two miles. Once out of the ravine,
the division was in full view of the Confederates with no cover. The Confederates fired immediately.
Stuart was at Crampton’s Gap on the morning of September 14. He conferred with Colonel Thomas T. Munford and told him to hold the gap. All total, approximately 1200 Confederates were at Crampton’s and Brownsville preparing to face approximately 12,000 men from the 6th Corps.
While the two armies skirmish lines made contact on the east side of town, Munford deployed a line along Mountain Church Road. The mile long line ran from the corner of Main Street along Mountain Church Road with the troops taking cover behind a stone wall. The men were posted thinly at eight foot intervals behind the stone wall and told not to fire until the enemy was in good range. It was from this line that the Union troops emerging from the Runs first met small-arms fire while artillery fire from the mountain rained down on them. Despite the Confederates advantage of position, coverage behind stone walls and clear fields of fire, the Union troops were able to advance to 300 yards from the Confederate line and take cover behind stone walls and fence rails on the farms. However, they had to halt at this point due to Confederate resistance as well as the formation Bartlett had planned had fallen apart as they crossed the rough terrain. Once the Union troops had all gathered to their positions, it was clear that a standoff fight would not break the Confederate position and that only a headlong rush would break it. The Union prepared for the charge.
In the meantime, Franklin ordered Brooks to advance his men on the left of the pass in an attempt to create a division and turn the Confederate flank. On the Confederate side, reinforcements had arrived in the way of Brigadier General Howell Cobb’s brigade at Crampton’s.
When Cobb arrived, a loud cheer for the reinforcements went up causing the tired Confederates on the Mountain Church line to fall back since they believed they were about to be reinforced and Union fire had dissipated. It was an unfortunate time to fall back because this is when the Union launched their charge. The Confederate line broke and the troops ran up the mountain. The Union followed in hot pursuit and claimed the stone wall that only minutes ago the Confederates held. The Union continued to push up the mountain after the fleeing
Stuart was at Crampton’s Gap on the morning of September 14. He conferred with Colonel Thomas T. Munford and told him to hold the gap. All total, approximately 1200 Confederates were at Crampton’s and Brownsville preparing to face approximately 12,000 men from the 6th Corps.
While the two armies skirmish lines made contact on the east side of town, Munford deployed a line along Mountain Church Road. The mile long line ran from the corner of Main Street along Mountain Church Road with the troops taking cover behind a stone wall. The men were posted thinly at eight foot intervals behind the stone wall and told not to fire until the enemy was in good range. It was from this line that the Union troops emerging from the Runs first met small-arms fire while artillery fire from the mountain rained down on them. Despite the Confederates advantage of position, coverage behind stone walls and clear fields of fire, the Union troops were able to advance to 300 yards from the Confederate line and take cover behind stone walls and fence rails on the farms. However, they had to halt at this point due to Confederate resistance as well as the formation Bartlett had planned had fallen apart as they crossed the rough terrain. Once the Union troops had all gathered to their positions, it was clear that a standoff fight would not break the Confederate position and that only a headlong rush would break it. The Union prepared for the charge.
In the meantime, Franklin ordered Brooks to advance his men on the left of the pass in an attempt to create a division and turn the Confederate flank. On the Confederate side, reinforcements had arrived in the way of Brigadier General Howell Cobb’s brigade at Crampton’s.
When Cobb arrived, a loud cheer for the reinforcements went up causing the tired Confederates on the Mountain Church line to fall back since they believed they were about to be reinforced and Union fire had dissipated. It was an unfortunate time to fall back because this is when the Union launched their charge. The Confederate line broke and the troops ran up the mountain. The Union followed in hot pursuit and claimed the stone wall that only minutes ago the Confederates held. The Union continued to push up the mountain after the fleeing
Confederates. Brooks continued his advance, while being heavily shelled from Brownsville, all the way to the Arnold Farm. They stopped at the barn and haystack to wait for the rest of the brigade to catch up. Some Confederate resistance was still in the woods and behind the stone wall on Main Street directly across from the Arnold Farm. Brooks intended to flush them out. Brooks formed a line, charged the stone wall, and assaulted the Confederates successfully. The Confederates retreated up the mountain. Now the Confederate center and right flank was destroyed.
Further down Mountain Church Road, Cake led the charge against the Confederate left. They used a series of fences to advance their position until they reached a cornfield at the edge of the road. The charge was a success and broke the remaining Confederate line. The Confederates rushed up the mountain through Whipp’s Ravine. The Union had secured Mountain Church Road for themselves. The troops continued up the mountain after the fleeing Confederates. Although Cobb attempted to form a Confederate line at the summit, the Confederates were again overrun as the Union charged out of the woods, ravine and up Gapland road. With the defeat of Cobb, Crampton’s Gap was lost to the Confederates. All that was left was to attempt to form a line on the western side of the mountain in the valley below to stem the Union tide.
While the bulk of the Union troops focused on the summit, some of Brooks’ men followed the Confederates on a wagon track located on the Arnold Farm up the mountain who were fleeing to Brownsville Pass. It was here that the 16th VA regiment was captured by bluff.
This effectively ended the battle as night fell and the Union troops were too exhausted to pursue the Confederates into the valley. The Union fell back to the woods of the western base of the mountain and formed a line from Gapland Road to Rohrersville Road.
Fox & Turner Gaps AM
On the morning of September 14, it was determined that a Confederate force of unknown strength occupied Turner’s Gap. An artillery attempt to flush out the Confederates was unsuccessful. As a result, Brigadier General Alfred Pleasanton (Cavalry) and Brigadier General Jacob Cox (of Major General Jesse Reno’s 9th Corps) formed a battle plan to rid the gap of Confederates. Due to the nature of terrain, a frontal assault was not sound but instead a flank
Further down Mountain Church Road, Cake led the charge against the Confederate left. They used a series of fences to advance their position until they reached a cornfield at the edge of the road. The charge was a success and broke the remaining Confederate line. The Confederates rushed up the mountain through Whipp’s Ravine. The Union had secured Mountain Church Road for themselves. The troops continued up the mountain after the fleeing Confederates. Although Cobb attempted to form a Confederate line at the summit, the Confederates were again overrun as the Union charged out of the woods, ravine and up Gapland road. With the defeat of Cobb, Crampton’s Gap was lost to the Confederates. All that was left was to attempt to form a line on the western side of the mountain in the valley below to stem the Union tide.
While the bulk of the Union troops focused on the summit, some of Brooks’ men followed the Confederates on a wagon track located on the Arnold Farm up the mountain who were fleeing to Brownsville Pass. It was here that the 16th VA regiment was captured by bluff.
This effectively ended the battle as night fell and the Union troops were too exhausted to pursue the Confederates into the valley. The Union fell back to the woods of the western base of the mountain and formed a line from Gapland Road to Rohrersville Road.
Fox & Turner Gaps AM
On the morning of September 14, it was determined that a Confederate force of unknown strength occupied Turner’s Gap. An artillery attempt to flush out the Confederates was unsuccessful. As a result, Brigadier General Alfred Pleasanton (Cavalry) and Brigadier General Jacob Cox (of Major General Jesse Reno’s 9th Corps) formed a battle plan to rid the gap of Confederates. Due to the nature of terrain, a frontal assault was not sound but instead a flank
attack at Fox’s Gap to crush the Confederates at Turner’s was agreed upon. Pleasanton would continue to make a stand on the National Turnpike while Colonel Eliakim P. Scammon’s brigade followed Old Sharpsburg Road to Fox’s Gap to outflank the Confederates.
The terrain of South Mountain at Turner and Fox Gaps is a series of irregular hills that range between 1000-1700 feet in elevation. The mountain is covered with dense forest and patches of mountain laurel. Granite boulders were in an abundance and used to make numerous stone walls for the farms on the mountain. The National Turnpike was the best road crossing the mountain. It was a macadamized road 25 feet wide. Two networks of narrow and steep roads crisscrossed the mountain to and from the turnpike along with a series of farm lanes that stemmed from these lesser roads. The roads important to Fox Gap were; Old Sharpsburg Road which stemmed off of National Turnpike and led to and over Fox’s Gap, Ridge Road which ran north for one mile and joined several wagon trails. At Turner, where the National Turnpike crossed the mountain, there was another network of roads. Near the Mountain House was Dahlgren Road which ran east and north through a series of twists and turns until it terminated at Mount Tabor Road. Slightly north of this intersection was Frosttown Road which ran north and then west over the mountain to meet Zittlestown Road. Zittlestown Road ran back to the National Road slightly west of the Mountain House.
This encircling road networks were an advantage for the Confederates because they had cover, interior lines, and numerous avenues of approach. The Union had to spread its force across three miles to cover all approaches.
Hill reached Turner’s Gap by sunrise to find Stuart had left for Crampton’s Gap. He assessed the situation. He found it was not adequately guarded by his two brigades already posted there and ordered up more reinforcements from his division. The Confederate line as Hill found it was slightly down the mountain on the north side of the turnpike and extended to the road with a stone wall for cover. The line continued south of the road in the woods on the slope of the mountain. Hill ordered Brigadier General Samuel Garland to position his brigade at Fox’s Gap and to stretch the line so it would connect with the end of Colonel Alfred Colquitt’s line. Hill determined the defense of Fox’s Gap was critical in defending both gaps and his supply wagons at Boonsboro.
The terrain of South Mountain at Turner and Fox Gaps is a series of irregular hills that range between 1000-1700 feet in elevation. The mountain is covered with dense forest and patches of mountain laurel. Granite boulders were in an abundance and used to make numerous stone walls for the farms on the mountain. The National Turnpike was the best road crossing the mountain. It was a macadamized road 25 feet wide. Two networks of narrow and steep roads crisscrossed the mountain to and from the turnpike along with a series of farm lanes that stemmed from these lesser roads. The roads important to Fox Gap were; Old Sharpsburg Road which stemmed off of National Turnpike and led to and over Fox’s Gap, Ridge Road which ran north for one mile and joined several wagon trails. At Turner, where the National Turnpike crossed the mountain, there was another network of roads. Near the Mountain House was Dahlgren Road which ran east and north through a series of twists and turns until it terminated at Mount Tabor Road. Slightly north of this intersection was Frosttown Road which ran north and then west over the mountain to meet Zittlestown Road. Zittlestown Road ran back to the National Road slightly west of the Mountain House.
This encircling road networks were an advantage for the Confederates because they had cover, interior lines, and numerous avenues of approach. The Union had to spread its force across three miles to cover all approaches.
Hill reached Turner’s Gap by sunrise to find Stuart had left for Crampton’s Gap. He assessed the situation. He found it was not adequately guarded by his two brigades already posted there and ordered up more reinforcements from his division. The Confederate line as Hill found it was slightly down the mountain on the north side of the turnpike and extended to the road with a stone wall for cover. The line continued south of the road in the woods on the slope of the mountain. Hill ordered Brigadier General Samuel Garland to position his brigade at Fox’s Gap and to stretch the line so it would connect with the end of Colonel Alfred Colquitt’s line. Hill determined the defense of Fox’s Gap was critical in defending both gaps and his supply wagons at Boonsboro.
Garland marched along Ridge Road one mile to Fox’s Gap. Upon reaching the gap, Garland placed his troops along Ridge Road to cover Old Sharpsburg Road, they faced the north pasture of Daniel Wise’ farm. His line did not extend to meet Colquitt’s, instead a 400 yard gap existed between the two brigades. The rest of Garland’s brigade went south of the intersection and spread out along Ridge Road, facing another Wise field and Farmer’s Gap Road. These troops had the cover of woods and a stone wall that ran along Ridge Road. A gap of 250 yards was in the brigade, although partially filled with Captain James Bondurant’s guns.
It was around 9AM when the two opponents clashed at Fox’s Gap. The Confederates pushed through the woods to a partial clearing where they encountered the Cox’ troops. Initially, the Confederates had the advantage of cover but the Union pushed through in a series of charges until they were hit by another body of Confederates covered by a stone wall and hedgerow. The Union found their own stone wall to hide behind to escape the deadly fire. Thus began the shuffling of Confederate troops to meet the Union threat that appeared to be focused south of the gap but it was not enough to stem the tide. The Union regrouped and launched another furious charge which broke the Confederate line. The Confederate center and right was decimated and they retreated west of Fox’s Gap.
The fight between Cox and Garland ended around Noon and the bodies were strewn across the pastures and cornfields, behind stone walls, along Ridge Road and in Wise’s garden. Cox now had control of Fox’s Gap which threatened the flank and rear of the Confederates at Turner’s Gap.
Although the morning fight had ended, it was simply a lull in the fighting for the day. Hill continued to have the artillery harass Cox at Fox’s Gap and the rest of the Union army on the turnpike to create an impression that he was strongly fortified until reinforcements actually did arrive. During this time he took the opportunity to reorganize his line as reinforcements did arrive. With the massing of the Union army on the turnpike, Hill assumed the main attack would be at Turner’s Gap but he still had concerns for his right flank at Fox’s Gap where the Union now held the commanding ground of Crest Ridge. Therefore, he formed a line that stretched further west along Old Sharpsburg Road with the orders to advance through the woods in their
It was around 9AM when the two opponents clashed at Fox’s Gap. The Confederates pushed through the woods to a partial clearing where they encountered the Cox’ troops. Initially, the Confederates had the advantage of cover but the Union pushed through in a series of charges until they were hit by another body of Confederates covered by a stone wall and hedgerow. The Union found their own stone wall to hide behind to escape the deadly fire. Thus began the shuffling of Confederate troops to meet the Union threat that appeared to be focused south of the gap but it was not enough to stem the tide. The Union regrouped and launched another furious charge which broke the Confederate line. The Confederate center and right was decimated and they retreated west of Fox’s Gap.
The fight between Cox and Garland ended around Noon and the bodies were strewn across the pastures and cornfields, behind stone walls, along Ridge Road and in Wise’s garden. Cox now had control of Fox’s Gap which threatened the flank and rear of the Confederates at Turner’s Gap.
Although the morning fight had ended, it was simply a lull in the fighting for the day. Hill continued to have the artillery harass Cox at Fox’s Gap and the rest of the Union army on the turnpike to create an impression that he was strongly fortified until reinforcements actually did arrive. During this time he took the opportunity to reorganize his line as reinforcements did arrive. With the massing of the Union army on the turnpike, Hill assumed the main attack would be at Turner’s Gap but he still had concerns for his right flank at Fox’s Gap where the Union now held the commanding ground of Crest Ridge. Therefore, he formed a line that stretched further west along Old Sharpsburg Road with the orders to advance through the woods in their
front and attack the Union. Due to the nature of how the road was shaped, it was impossible for the three brigades (Brigadier Generals Roswell Ripley, G.B. Anderson, G.T. Anderson) to form a cohesive line to sweep through the woods. Furthermore, Brigadier General Thomas Drayton’s brigade remained north of the Old Sharpsburg Road, spread out in the woods behind a stone wall on Ridge Road.
Cox also received reinforcements as Brigadier General Orlando Wilcox made his way on Old Sharpsburg Road to Fox’s Gap. Wilcox moved his brigade into position next to Cox south of Old Sharpsburg Road. Wilcox’s orders were to silence Bondurant’s guns. His plan of attack was to have Cox support Wilcox’s left flank as the rest of his division moved uphill to seize the wooded ridge that ran north parallel to Ridge Road. This ridge commanded all of Wise’s north and south pastures, therefore commanding all of Fox’s Gaps. One regiment at a time would cross Old Sharpsburg Road and move into Wise’s north pasture and advance on the Confederates on Ridge Road.
The 45th PA advanced and was met by a hail of fire from Drayton’s men tucked safely behind the stone wall. The Union returned fire from 80 yards which gave their “Harpers Ferry” smoothbore muskets deadly accuracy. Bondurant’s guns fired, taking down men, trees, and fences. The battle raged in Wise’s pasture and the woods behind it. The 17th Michigan advanced next but were greeted with fire from Drayton’s skirmishers who had taken cover behind a pile of stacked fences along the western edge of the woods. However, the 17th MI pressed on and made it to the stone wall that crossed into Wise’s north pasture where Bondurant blasted them and sent them running into the road only to meet gunfire from the GT Anderson’s brigade on the opposite side of the road. Undeterred, the 17th MI pressed on and went back into Wise’s north pasture with the intent of flanking the Confederates on Ridge Road. As a result of this advance, the 17th MI moved past the Drayton’s flank on Ridge Road and the Confederates withdrew down the western side of the mountain. The 17th MI then turned their attack to the Confederates in Wise’s south pasture and in the woods. Taking cover behind the stone wall on Old Sharpsburg Road, they opened a devastating fire on the Confederates. The Union had cleared the Confederates off of the Wise pastures, Old Sharpsburg Road, and Ridge Road.
Cox also received reinforcements as Brigadier General Orlando Wilcox made his way on Old Sharpsburg Road to Fox’s Gap. Wilcox moved his brigade into position next to Cox south of Old Sharpsburg Road. Wilcox’s orders were to silence Bondurant’s guns. His plan of attack was to have Cox support Wilcox’s left flank as the rest of his division moved uphill to seize the wooded ridge that ran north parallel to Ridge Road. This ridge commanded all of Wise’s north and south pastures, therefore commanding all of Fox’s Gaps. One regiment at a time would cross Old Sharpsburg Road and move into Wise’s north pasture and advance on the Confederates on Ridge Road.
The 45th PA advanced and was met by a hail of fire from Drayton’s men tucked safely behind the stone wall. The Union returned fire from 80 yards which gave their “Harpers Ferry” smoothbore muskets deadly accuracy. Bondurant’s guns fired, taking down men, trees, and fences. The battle raged in Wise’s pasture and the woods behind it. The 17th Michigan advanced next but were greeted with fire from Drayton’s skirmishers who had taken cover behind a pile of stacked fences along the western edge of the woods. However, the 17th MI pressed on and made it to the stone wall that crossed into Wise’s north pasture where Bondurant blasted them and sent them running into the road only to meet gunfire from the GT Anderson’s brigade on the opposite side of the road. Undeterred, the 17th MI pressed on and went back into Wise’s north pasture with the intent of flanking the Confederates on Ridge Road. As a result of this advance, the 17th MI moved past the Drayton’s flank on Ridge Road and the Confederates withdrew down the western side of the mountain. The 17th MI then turned their attack to the Confederates in Wise’s south pasture and in the woods. Taking cover behind the stone wall on Old Sharpsburg Road, they opened a devastating fire on the Confederates. The Union had cleared the Confederates off of the Wise pastures, Old Sharpsburg Road, and Ridge Road.
Drayton’s withdraw left a gaping hole in the Confederate line. With Drayton out of action, the Confederate line south of Old Sharpsburg Road was now open to be flanked and cut off as well as the interior line to Turner’s Gap and the Mountain House. However, all was not lost as Brigadier General John B. Hood reached the field and formed a line with GT Anderson near the intersection of Ridge and Old Sharpsburg Roads around 5:30PM. Hood engaged in a light firefight to determine the Union’s position but not much more could be done as it was now nightfall. Nonetheless, Hood had closed the road to Turner’s Gap so that the Union could not pursue the Confederates in their rear. The Confederates retreated back to Turner’s Gap as Hood kept up sporadic fire to cover the withdraw until 10PM. The battle for Fox’s Gap was over.
Fox & Turner Gaps PM
At 10AM Major General Joseph Hooker began his march from Frederick on the National Turnpike to South Mountain and arrived one mile west of Middletown around 2PM. Hooker observed the terrain from this vantage point and saw three hills of varying elevations (1280-1360 ft, now labeled as Southern 1280, Middle 1500, North 1360), a deep ravine (or Gorge as the Confederates called it) that ran east-west, and two roads that stemmed off of Mount Tabor Road and ran along either side of the ravine. Dahlgren Road ran steep and intersected the southern two hills until it met on the eastern side of the turnpike. Frosttown Road ran steeper around the northern hill until it intersected with Zittlestown Rd which led back to the turnpike on the western side of the mountain. All three hills were heavily wooded, full of rocks, and steep. Some cultivated fields were present and marked by stone walls. As Hooker noted, the key terrain needed to be taken was the Middle hill, at 1500 ft situated between Dahlgren and Frosttown Roads. Possession of this hill by the Union would render it useless by the Confederates who had their force strung out along it.
Hooker formed a battle plan. Hooker along with Major General Ambrose Burnside, rode up to give Brigadier General George Meade his orders at Catoctin Creek.. They discussed that the best way to hit the enemy flank was to march along the turnpike to Bolivar and then turn onto Mount Tabor Road. From there, Meade’s Division would follow the road until he reached the Confederate flank. The division marched to Mount Tabor Church, about one mile further north
Fox & Turner Gaps PM
At 10AM Major General Joseph Hooker began his march from Frederick on the National Turnpike to South Mountain and arrived one mile west of Middletown around 2PM. Hooker observed the terrain from this vantage point and saw three hills of varying elevations (1280-1360 ft, now labeled as Southern 1280, Middle 1500, North 1360), a deep ravine (or Gorge as the Confederates called it) that ran east-west, and two roads that stemmed off of Mount Tabor Road and ran along either side of the ravine. Dahlgren Road ran steep and intersected the southern two hills until it met on the eastern side of the turnpike. Frosttown Road ran steeper around the northern hill until it intersected with Zittlestown Rd which led back to the turnpike on the western side of the mountain. All three hills were heavily wooded, full of rocks, and steep. Some cultivated fields were present and marked by stone walls. As Hooker noted, the key terrain needed to be taken was the Middle hill, at 1500 ft situated between Dahlgren and Frosttown Roads. Possession of this hill by the Union would render it useless by the Confederates who had their force strung out along it.
Hooker formed a battle plan. Hooker along with Major General Ambrose Burnside, rode up to give Brigadier General George Meade his orders at Catoctin Creek.. They discussed that the best way to hit the enemy flank was to march along the turnpike to Bolivar and then turn onto Mount Tabor Road. From there, Meade’s Division would follow the road until he reached the Confederate flank. The division marched to Mount Tabor Church, about one mile further north
over a very rough and rocky road. At this point, Meade moved his division into position in the fields surrounding the road. From here, they could see the Confederates on the mountain. Hooker wanted Brigadier General John Hatch’s Division to operate between the area of Dahlgren-Turnpike. Both divisions would advance up the mountain to turn either side of the Confederate flank. Brigadier General James Rickett’s Division would be held at Mount Tabor Church to support either of the other two divisions.
In the meantime, Hill was reinforcing his line after the morning battle at Fox’s Gap. He called up his last remaining brigade from Boonsboro, Brigadier General Robert Rodes, and placed it north of the National Turnpike and Dahlgren Road to secure the ridge that commanded the turnpike if taken by the Union. Facing the 1st Corps, was one brigade of the Confederates led by Rodes (1350 men facing 14,000). Rodes ordered the 12th AL to post a skirmish line that would cover his right flank on the southern hill and the approach to the Confederate line through the gorge. The 12th AL advanced their way down the slope of the southern hill to the mouth of the gorge and positioned themselves behind trees on Dahlgren Road. They had a perfect view of the Meade’s troops. Just like Hooker, Hill was observing the terrain situation and saw that Hooker could easily claim the Northern hill and turn Hill’s flank at the Middle hill which was the key terrain feature for Turner. In order to stop this potential flanking, Hill ordered Rodes to extend his line across the Gorge and cover the Northern hill. Neither Hill nor Rodes were aware of Zittlestown Rd until Rodes positioned his end line there. However, by protecting this portion of South Mountain, Rodes left close to a mile gap in his line between his right flank on Southern hill and the turnpike. There was no one left to cover the gap as all reinforcements had been sent to Fox’s Gap so Rodes stretched the 12th AL as far as he could.
Realizing the absolute importance of Zittlestown Road and what it meant to his flank, Rodes sent his other four regiments to form a line along the Northern hill that stretched back across the Gorge along the Middle hill. It was evident to Rodes that Hooker intended to sweep the Gorge as well as outflank his line on the Northern hill by half a mile. There was no way to stop the oncoming onslaught, but until reinforcements arrived, Rodes hoped to hold the line.
In the meantime, Hill was reinforcing his line after the morning battle at Fox’s Gap. He called up his last remaining brigade from Boonsboro, Brigadier General Robert Rodes, and placed it north of the National Turnpike and Dahlgren Road to secure the ridge that commanded the turnpike if taken by the Union. Facing the 1st Corps, was one brigade of the Confederates led by Rodes (1350 men facing 14,000). Rodes ordered the 12th AL to post a skirmish line that would cover his right flank on the southern hill and the approach to the Confederate line through the gorge. The 12th AL advanced their way down the slope of the southern hill to the mouth of the gorge and positioned themselves behind trees on Dahlgren Road. They had a perfect view of the Meade’s troops. Just like Hooker, Hill was observing the terrain situation and saw that Hooker could easily claim the Northern hill and turn Hill’s flank at the Middle hill which was the key terrain feature for Turner. In order to stop this potential flanking, Hill ordered Rodes to extend his line across the Gorge and cover the Northern hill. Neither Hill nor Rodes were aware of Zittlestown Rd until Rodes positioned his end line there. However, by protecting this portion of South Mountain, Rodes left close to a mile gap in his line between his right flank on Southern hill and the turnpike. There was no one left to cover the gap as all reinforcements had been sent to Fox’s Gap so Rodes stretched the 12th AL as far as he could.
Realizing the absolute importance of Zittlestown Road and what it meant to his flank, Rodes sent his other four regiments to form a line along the Northern hill that stretched back across the Gorge along the Middle hill. It was evident to Rodes that Hooker intended to sweep the Gorge as well as outflank his line on the Northern hill by half a mile. There was no way to stop the oncoming onslaught, but until reinforcements arrived, Rodes hoped to hold the line.
Around 3PM Meade’s division marched along Old Hagerstown Road until it intersected with Frosttown and Mount Tabor Roads. From there, Meade spread out his division on both sides of Frosttown Road and advanced towards Rodes. Rodes deployed skirmishers but they fell back quickly. Brigadier General Truman Seymour informed Meade he could secure the Northern hill and get behind Rodes’ flank to advance on the Frosttown gorge and thereby secure the Middle hill. Meade gave the go ahead and in an attempted concerted effort, his full division attempted to advance over the rough terrain but the main assault succumbed to the mountain, lost cohesion, and instead offered three staggered thrusts against the Confederates. The battle was on.
Between 4:30-5PM, Hooker began his assault. The division advanced up the slope and met nothing but rugged terrain. It was impossible to keep anything that resembled a formation line. Hiding behind trees and rocks, Rodes’ brigade poured fire into the Union. However, the Union troops persisted and the Confederates fell back. As the Northern hill was about to fall to the Union, Rodes put the 6th AL into line on his extreme left to counter the Union attack. With a little more shifting of regiments, Rodes partially sealed the gap in his crumbling line. Undeterred, the Union quickly deployed Seymour’s PA Reserves to meet the shift in the Confederate line and received a murderous volley. Seymour wanted nothing more than to seize the Northern hill from the southwest near the head of the gorge that the Confederates were now desperately clinging onto. The 5th PA Reserves fired a deadly volley into the Confederate line and hit Rodes’ flank. This caused Rodes to retreat back to the Middle hill. The Union pushed on towards the Middle hill where the Confederates made good use of the terrain to find cover and keep firing. Attempting to cross the gorge, the 11th PA Reserves were greeted with a murderous fire by the 3rd and 12th AL posted behind the rocks on the slope. The Union returned fire and the gorge became a battle of its own.
The Union poured more reinforcements into the battle by way of the 10th PA Reserves which eased the pressure on the 9th and 11th PA Reserves. This broke the stalemate and the Union pushed on. Rodes’ left flank had been turned and the front was driven in. Rodes called for reinforcements but none came. Already heavily outnumbered, Rodes faced Union reinforcement from Brigadier General Abram Duryea’s Brigade. However, by the time Duryea took the field, Seymour was already wrapping things up on the Confederate flank. The Union tide was storming
Between 4:30-5PM, Hooker began his assault. The division advanced up the slope and met nothing but rugged terrain. It was impossible to keep anything that resembled a formation line. Hiding behind trees and rocks, Rodes’ brigade poured fire into the Union. However, the Union troops persisted and the Confederates fell back. As the Northern hill was about to fall to the Union, Rodes put the 6th AL into line on his extreme left to counter the Union attack. With a little more shifting of regiments, Rodes partially sealed the gap in his crumbling line. Undeterred, the Union quickly deployed Seymour’s PA Reserves to meet the shift in the Confederate line and received a murderous volley. Seymour wanted nothing more than to seize the Northern hill from the southwest near the head of the gorge that the Confederates were now desperately clinging onto. The 5th PA Reserves fired a deadly volley into the Confederate line and hit Rodes’ flank. This caused Rodes to retreat back to the Middle hill. The Union pushed on towards the Middle hill where the Confederates made good use of the terrain to find cover and keep firing. Attempting to cross the gorge, the 11th PA Reserves were greeted with a murderous fire by the 3rd and 12th AL posted behind the rocks on the slope. The Union returned fire and the gorge became a battle of its own.
The Union poured more reinforcements into the battle by way of the 10th PA Reserves which eased the pressure on the 9th and 11th PA Reserves. This broke the stalemate and the Union pushed on. Rodes’ left flank had been turned and the front was driven in. Rodes called for reinforcements but none came. Already heavily outnumbered, Rodes faced Union reinforcement from Brigadier General Abram Duryea’s Brigade. However, by the time Duryea took the field, Seymour was already wrapping things up on the Confederate flank. The Union tide was storming
the Confederates and Rodes fell back to the summit of South Mountain. As a result, the Northern and Middle hills were lost to the Union. Rodes ordered his brigade to cover the approaches to Turner’s Gap. Although the battle was over and the National Turnpike was lost, Rodes held his ground until 11PM when he finally withdrew to Keedysville.
Hatch met with Hooker at Mount Tabor Church to hear the battle plan. Hooker had devised a plan of two attacks and a smaller attack: Meade would move against Rodes from Frosttown Road. Hooker then planned to deploy Hatch’s division between the Turnpike and Frosttown Road and have it connect with Meade’s division, on the right, at Dahlgren Road and then stretch left to the Turnpike to advance up the mountain, and from Hatch’s division, Brigadier General John Gibbon’s Brigade would be directly deployed against Colonel Alfred Colquitt’s Brigade straight up the turnpike.
Hatch devised his plan of attack. Patrick’s brigade would move first, with two regiments acting as a skirmish line to find the Confederate position and block any Confederate attempt to flank Cox on the left of the National Turnpike. Then would follow Colonel Walter Phelps’ Brigade and Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s Brigade to push up the mountain.
The terrain Hatch faced was rocky and broken, causing the Union to stop every fifteen to twenty paces in order to reform their line of advance. The Confederates (Brigadier Generals Richard Garnett and James Kemper) on the crest fired into the advancing line but shot over their heads. Firing over the heads of the Union continued to happen even as the Union was only 50 paces from the fence the Confederates were lodged behind. The Union continued to steadily move up the mountain towards the Confederate V shaped line which was hardly sound for firing on the oncoming Union mass. The Union was easily able to outflank both sides of the V. The Confederates fell back from the pressure of the attack. However, in an unfortunate series of events for the Union, they were forced to halt which gave the Confederates time to reform their line behind fences and rocks. They renewed the attack on the Union. Nonetheless, the Union was reinforced and pushed harder which caused the Confederates to break and run, but there were still enough Confederates on the crest and they rallied themselves for a renewed attack with the advantage of the cloaking dusk which hid their positions. Men on each side fired towards where
Hatch met with Hooker at Mount Tabor Church to hear the battle plan. Hooker had devised a plan of two attacks and a smaller attack: Meade would move against Rodes from Frosttown Road. Hooker then planned to deploy Hatch’s division between the Turnpike and Frosttown Road and have it connect with Meade’s division, on the right, at Dahlgren Road and then stretch left to the Turnpike to advance up the mountain, and from Hatch’s division, Brigadier General John Gibbon’s Brigade would be directly deployed against Colonel Alfred Colquitt’s Brigade straight up the turnpike.
Hatch devised his plan of attack. Patrick’s brigade would move first, with two regiments acting as a skirmish line to find the Confederate position and block any Confederate attempt to flank Cox on the left of the National Turnpike. Then would follow Colonel Walter Phelps’ Brigade and Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s Brigade to push up the mountain.
The terrain Hatch faced was rocky and broken, causing the Union to stop every fifteen to twenty paces in order to reform their line of advance. The Confederates (Brigadier Generals Richard Garnett and James Kemper) on the crest fired into the advancing line but shot over their heads. Firing over the heads of the Union continued to happen even as the Union was only 50 paces from the fence the Confederates were lodged behind. The Union continued to steadily move up the mountain towards the Confederate V shaped line which was hardly sound for firing on the oncoming Union mass. The Union was easily able to outflank both sides of the V. The Confederates fell back from the pressure of the attack. However, in an unfortunate series of events for the Union, they were forced to halt which gave the Confederates time to reform their line behind fences and rocks. They renewed the attack on the Union. Nonetheless, the Union was reinforced and pushed harder which caused the Confederates to break and run, but there were still enough Confederates on the crest and they rallied themselves for a renewed attack with the advantage of the cloaking dusk which hid their positions. Men on each side fired towards where
they saw shots coming from the opposing side since they couldn’t see the actual persons. The majority of this fighting occurred within 15 paces of each other. The fighting in this section ended for the night and the Confederates retreated down the western side of the mountain.
To meet the Union, were three brigades from Brigadier General D.R. Jones’ Division, Jenkins, Kemper, Garnett. They marched from Boonsboro up the mountain with orders to reinforce Turner’s Gap at the turnpike. Once they reached the summit, Kemper went to Dahlgren Road to support Brigadier General Nathan Evans and Colquitt. Kemper marched on Dahlgren Road to the point where the gorge opens. He placed his brigade across the road and faced Meade’s oncoming assault. Kemper’s main concern was the security of his right flank because it was heavily wooded and provided an excellent unseen avenue of approach by the Union before Garnett and Jenkins arrived.
Garnett arrived and formed his line on the farm of D. Rent. Although a gap existed between Garnett and Kemper, it was too late to adequately fix it because Hatch’s division was pushing its way up the Southern hill. The opposing forces met, the majority at a distance of only 45 yards apart and fired into each other causing mass casualties. The contest raged over a fence. Hatch had the numerical advantage, and the Confederates gave way unable to hold their position. For the small portion of Confederates that did cling to the position, they were met with a charge ordered by Hatch. Phelps charged the remaining Confederates and the line dissolved. The Union took that fence and advanced approximately 30 yards to a rise in the ground where they took cover. Phelps and Patrick held their position there, exhausted and low on ammunition.
Doubleday’s brigade joined the attack and pushed past the other two brigades. Past the fence, Doubleday found the open cornfield and observed the rocky ground that provided natural cover for the Confederates. As it grew darker, Doubleday was not able to see how few Confederates were in his front but judged it to be a considerable number based on the fierce fire still coming from that direction. Garnett used the darkness to his advantage and his 250 men held off Doubleday’s 1000 men. Doubleday remained on the defensive as he saw no point wasting ammunition on an enemy he couldn’t see. The Confederates began a slow retreat back up the mountain. By 9PM, they were at the Mountain House and had left the Southern hill to the Union.
To meet the Union, were three brigades from Brigadier General D.R. Jones’ Division, Jenkins, Kemper, Garnett. They marched from Boonsboro up the mountain with orders to reinforce Turner’s Gap at the turnpike. Once they reached the summit, Kemper went to Dahlgren Road to support Brigadier General Nathan Evans and Colquitt. Kemper marched on Dahlgren Road to the point where the gorge opens. He placed his brigade across the road and faced Meade’s oncoming assault. Kemper’s main concern was the security of his right flank because it was heavily wooded and provided an excellent unseen avenue of approach by the Union before Garnett and Jenkins arrived.
Garnett arrived and formed his line on the farm of D. Rent. Although a gap existed between Garnett and Kemper, it was too late to adequately fix it because Hatch’s division was pushing its way up the Southern hill. The opposing forces met, the majority at a distance of only 45 yards apart and fired into each other causing mass casualties. The contest raged over a fence. Hatch had the numerical advantage, and the Confederates gave way unable to hold their position. For the small portion of Confederates that did cling to the position, they were met with a charge ordered by Hatch. Phelps charged the remaining Confederates and the line dissolved. The Union took that fence and advanced approximately 30 yards to a rise in the ground where they took cover. Phelps and Patrick held their position there, exhausted and low on ammunition.
Doubleday’s brigade joined the attack and pushed past the other two brigades. Past the fence, Doubleday found the open cornfield and observed the rocky ground that provided natural cover for the Confederates. As it grew darker, Doubleday was not able to see how few Confederates were in his front but judged it to be a considerable number based on the fierce fire still coming from that direction. Garnett used the darkness to his advantage and his 250 men held off Doubleday’s 1000 men. Doubleday remained on the defensive as he saw no point wasting ammunition on an enemy he couldn’t see. The Confederates began a slow retreat back up the mountain. By 9PM, they were at the Mountain House and had left the Southern hill to the Union.
Slightly further south of the previous engagement, Gibbon’s brigade participated in the third phase of Hooker’s overall battle plan in regards to Turner’s Gap. Gibbon was positioned in a field south of the turnpike awaiting orders to make his attack straight up the turnpike in support of Hooker and Reno’s main attacks. At 5PM, Gibbon received orders to advance up the turnpike and attack the Confederates holding the gorge and to fill in the line between Hooker and Reno. Colquitt’s brigade was astride the turnpike to cover the approaches to Turner’s Gap and to seal the gap between Fox’s Gap and the Southern hill. The Confederates had the advantage of terrain and hid behind a farmhouse, stone wall, and the woods. The skirmish lines met and the Union slowly drove the Confederates up. The two armies skirmished over a mile of ground with Confederates using every tree, rock, and fence to take cover behind. South of the turnpike, the 19th IN and 2nd WI advanced until it met heavy resistance near a farmhouse situated at the intersection of two farm roads and the turnpike about one mile west of Bolivar. With steady pressure, the Union skirmish line drove back the Confederate skirmish line into the woods. On the north side of the turnpike, the 7th & 6TH WI advanced until they reached a cornfield that was marked by a stone wall. Past the wall they could see the rocky terrain to woods line, after that they couldn’t see what was on the other side of the increasing slope of the Southern hill. Part of the men advanced across the cornfield into the meadows taking cover while the other men fired and then ran ahead of those covered until they could get no further than the middle of the meadow.
The general engagement for the turnpike opened once the 28th GA opened fire on the left flank of the 7th WI. The 6th WI joined the fray to meet the 28th GA and helped alleviate the pressure but they couldn’t remove the 28th GA from the stone wall they were hiding behind. Gibbon sent the 2nd WI on the opposite side of the turnpike to flank the 28th GA. They found a stone wall that ran at a right angle to the one the 28th GA was using for cover and fired into the Confederates. The 28th GA broke and retreated, taking along the 27th GA that had been sent to reinforce them. The south of the turnpike was now cleared off Confederates.
The 2nd WI attempted to flank the 23rd GA without success. They changed their formation and ran parallel along the turnpike and the flank of the 23rd GA. They fired endlessly until they
The general engagement for the turnpike opened once the 28th GA opened fire on the left flank of the 7th WI. The 6th WI joined the fray to meet the 28th GA and helped alleviate the pressure but they couldn’t remove the 28th GA from the stone wall they were hiding behind. Gibbon sent the 2nd WI on the opposite side of the turnpike to flank the 28th GA. They found a stone wall that ran at a right angle to the one the 28th GA was using for cover and fired into the Confederates. The 28th GA broke and retreated, taking along the 27th GA that had been sent to reinforce them. The south of the turnpike was now cleared off Confederates.
The 2nd WI attempted to flank the 23rd GA without success. They changed their formation and ran parallel along the turnpike and the flank of the 23rd GA. They fired endlessly until they
ran low on ammunition and were replaced with the 19th IN. However, the 23rd GA and 28th GA held their ground. Darkness fell and both sides were low on ammunition. Sporadic firing continued and both sides attempted to maneuver in the dark to outflank the other side but without any results. Colquitt pulled his brigade back up the mountain and at 10PM withdrew to the Mountain House. During the night, the Confederates withdrew and Gibbon’s brigade advanced up the mountain where they claimed victory for the battle.
Although separate spheres of action did overlap, the Confederate line at Fox’s Gap was broken by Reno’s 9th Corps. At Turner’s Gap, the Confederate left was also knocked out by Hooker’s 1st Corps and Hooker took all three hills. The Confederate center, held by Colquitt, was forced back by Gibbon’s brigade. The Confederates had suffered a huge defeat at all three gaps on South Mountain. Realizing the danger his entire army was in, Lee sent out orders during the night for all divisions to retreat to Sharpsburg in order to cross the Potomac and safely withdraw. Finding the terrain of Sharpsburg to his liking, Lee offered one more major battle on September 17, Antietam.
Although separate spheres of action did overlap, the Confederate line at Fox’s Gap was broken by Reno’s 9th Corps. At Turner’s Gap, the Confederate left was also knocked out by Hooker’s 1st Corps and Hooker took all three hills. The Confederate center, held by Colquitt, was forced back by Gibbon’s brigade. The Confederates had suffered a huge defeat at all three gaps on South Mountain. Realizing the danger his entire army was in, Lee sent out orders during the night for all divisions to retreat to Sharpsburg in order to cross the Potomac and safely withdraw. Finding the terrain of Sharpsburg to his liking, Lee offered one more major battle on September 17, Antietam.
The Lost Roads of South Mountain Battlefield
In general, “roads” is a generic term for small wagon paths/trails that were used by the local farmers to get to their fields. The exceptions are: Old Sharpburg Road which is now Reno Monument Road, Ridge Road (which has been altered from its original form), and Gapland Road.
Crampton’s Gap:
In general, “roads” is a generic term for small wagon paths/trails that were used by the local farmers to get to their fields. The exceptions are: Old Sharpburg Road which is now Reno Monument Road, Ridge Road (which has been altered from its original form), and Gapland Road.
Crampton’s Gap:
- Distillery Lane.
- Road to Confederate position at Brownsville Pass.
- Wagon road on Arnold Farm that connects to #4.
- Wagon road from Gapland Road to Brownsville Pass.
1. 2.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Wagon road that connected Fox and Turner Gaps (current AP Trail).
Western path off of the AP Trail that was created by Confederates pulling their artillery up the mountain from the turnpike, this path did not exist until the battle.
A portion of the original Ridge Road.
Trail from current Park Hall Road/Moser Road intersection to North Carolina position. Current Moser Road existed as a trail but did not have the name Moser.
Wagon road from Old Sharpsburg Road to Ridge Road.
A portion of Old Sharpsburg Road that runs adjacent to Reno Monument Road.
Roads from Ridge Road to Rohersville Road and Lamb’s Knoll.
Road leading from Ridge Road to fields further up the mountain.
Wise Cabin & Well (current parking lot).
Western path off of the AP Trail that was created by Confederates pulling their artillery up the mountain from the turnpike, this path did not exist until the battle.
A portion of the original Ridge Road.
Trail from current Park Hall Road/Moser Road intersection to North Carolina position. Current Moser Road existed as a trail but did not have the name Moser.
Wagon road from Old Sharpsburg Road to Ridge Road.
A portion of Old Sharpsburg Road that runs adjacent to Reno Monument Road.
Roads from Ridge Road to Rohersville Road and Lamb’s Knoll.
Road leading from Ridge Road to fields further up the mountain.
Wise Cabin & Well (current parking lot).
Turner’s Gap:
1. Farmer’s Gap Road.
1. Farmer’s Gap Road.
- Dahlgren Road did exist but was not named Dahlgren. It was a connecting loop called Frosttown Road which included current Dahlgren, Michael, and Frosttown Roads.
- Trail from modern Dahlgren Road connecting to Farmer’s Gap Road that spiked shortly after Farmer’s Gap Road to circle back to Dahlgren Road near Frosttown Road or could continue straight to Mount Tabor Road near the church.
- Both Wagon Depot (Corner of Fox Gap Road & Turnpike) and Toll House (Corner of Farmer’s Gap Road & Turnpike) are gone.
Primary Sources:
Bartlett, Joseph J. “Crampton’s Pass: The Start of the Great Maryland Campaign.” National Tribune, December 19, 1889.
Battle, Cullen Andrews. Third Alabama! The Civil War Memoir of Brigadier General Cullen Andrews Battle, CSA, ed. Brandon H. Beck. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2000.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. Robert Underwood Johnson & Clarence Buel. New York: Century Company, 1884-1888.
Carman, Ezra A. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Volume I. Thomas G. Clemens, ed., California: Savas Beatie, 2010.
Cox, Jacob Doleson. Military Reminiscences of the Civil War. New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1900.
Dawes, Rufus R. Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers. Marietta, Ohio: E.R. Alderman & Sons, 1890.
Gibbon, John. Personal Recollections of the Civil War. New York: G.P. Putnam’s & Sons, 1928.
Grattan, George D. “The Battle of Boonsboro Gap or South Mountain.” Southern Historical Society Papers 29 (1914).
Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960.
New York Public Library (NYPL), New York City, New York, Carman Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division MSS-473.
Strother, David Hunter. A Virginia Yankee in the Civil War. ed. Cecil D. Eby, Jr., Chapel Hill:
Bartlett, Joseph J. “Crampton’s Pass: The Start of the Great Maryland Campaign.” National Tribune, December 19, 1889.
Battle, Cullen Andrews. Third Alabama! The Civil War Memoir of Brigadier General Cullen Andrews Battle, CSA, ed. Brandon H. Beck. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2000.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. Robert Underwood Johnson & Clarence Buel. New York: Century Company, 1884-1888.
Carman, Ezra A. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Volume I. Thomas G. Clemens, ed., California: Savas Beatie, 2010.
Cox, Jacob Doleson. Military Reminiscences of the Civil War. New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1900.
Dawes, Rufus R. Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers. Marietta, Ohio: E.R. Alderman & Sons, 1890.
Gibbon, John. Personal Recollections of the Civil War. New York: G.P. Putnam’s & Sons, 1928.
Grattan, George D. “The Battle of Boonsboro Gap or South Mountain.” Southern Historical Society Papers 29 (1914).
Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960.
New York Public Library (NYPL), New York City, New York, Carman Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division MSS-473.
Strother, David Hunter. A Virginia Yankee in the Civil War. ed. Cecil D. Eby, Jr., Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1961.
U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and
Confederate A rmies. Series I. Vol. 19. Washington, DC: GPO, 1887.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC (NARA) RG 94,
Antietam Studies (AS), Records of the Adjutant General’s Office.
Secondary Sources:
Hartwig, D. Scott. To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.
Jordan, Brian M. The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory. New York & California: Savas Beatie, 2012.
U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and
Confederate A rmies. Series I. Vol. 19. Washington, DC: GPO, 1887.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC (NARA) RG 94,
Antietam Studies (AS), Records of the Adjutant General’s Office.
Secondary Sources:
Hartwig, D. Scott. To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.
Jordan, Brian M. The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory. New York & California: Savas Beatie, 2012.
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