My Friend

Today I lost a friend. He was a really good friend too. No matter what crazy Civil War ideas I threw his way, he listened patiently, explained the error of my ways, and then put me back on a normal path. Well, at least, as he would say, as normal of a path as normal can be for me.

He said he liked talking to me because I made him think about Civil War things that he had forgotten about. Sometimes I even told him things he did not know. It is hard to stump a master so I take real pride in outsmarting him every now and again.

He always asked about Jezebel. He would even bring me little containers of whatever he cooked over the weekend to give to Jezebel. Lasagna and chili were her favorites. In fact, he said he started talking to me because he could see how much I love Jezebel and he felt the same way about his cats. Then we found out how much we both loved the Civil War. Pets to war, odd stream.

A few months ago, he was the first person I talked to about my new interpretation of the Maryland Campaign. Not only did he not say I was crazy, but he actually supported my idea, told me to get to writing so that I can get published, and that undoubtedly I would be on the lecture circuit for my South Mountain theory. He was so excited about my idea! It was like a proud papa sending the young one off for the first swim.

So, I have decided the best way to honor my friend is with a special commitment. My commitment to my friend is that from this day forward I will work as hard as I can to become the best Maryland Campaign historian, to get my not so crazy idea published, and to give lectures to anyone who will listen. One year from today I will go to my friend's grave and I will give him a progress report and I will make him proud of me.

Thanks for everything Tony. I miss you tremendously.

Cedar Creek's Gentleman Planter

Intrigue and a Paint Brush

John Cochrane
(Wikipedia)

In 1813, John Cochrane was born in Palatine NY. Cochrane studied law, entered the bar in 1834, and moved to New York City in 1846. In the 1852 campaign, Cochrane avidly supported Franklin Pierce who in turn rewarded Cochrane with the appointment of Surveyor for the Port of NY. Next Cochrane was elected as a Democrat to both the 35th & 36th Congresses where he served as a Representative until March 3, 1861. His bid for reelection to the 37th Congress was unsuccessful but he did serve as a delegate at the Democratic National Conventions in Charleston and Baltimore in 1860. In June 1861, Cochrane joined the Union army as Colonel of the 65^th NY Infantry and was promoted to Brigadier in July 1862. During the Maryland Campaign, Cochrane commanded the 3rd brigade of  the 1st Division of the IV Corps. (1)


Cochrane was not a participant in the battle at Antietam because the IV Corps had been assigned to Harpers Ferry by McClellan. After the battle ended on the evening of 17th, McClellan assessed his situation and determined to renew the fight on the morning of the 18th. He sent orders to Couch to abandon Maryland Heights and move his IV Corps to Sharpsburg with haste. With the arrival of Couch (and Humphrey) on the morning of the 18th, as well as large portions of the V and VI Corps that had not been used in the previous day’s fighting, McClellan had nearly 30,000 fresh troops on hand. However, McClellan chose not to use these soldiers due to the strain of the night march. Instead, McClellan suspended orders to resume the fight and then succumbed to a case of dysentery. (2)

Although Cochrane missed being a part of this crucial battle, days later he made up for it by being part of a significant conversation. While this discussion is often referred to, it seems the importance of it is woefully understated. Members of what I call the “Emancipation Panel” included McClellan, Cochrane, Burnside, and Cox. On September 22th, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. As to why McClellan felt the need to respond to this proclamation is a mystery since he was well aware that he harbored powerful enemies in high places just waiting for a misstep to point to treasonous behavior. It would have been more appropriate and favorable for him to remain silent but that was not McClellan’s style. Nonetheless, he called these men together and, according to Cox, it was “for the purpose of asking our opinions and advice with regard to the course he should pursue respecting the Proclamation...and whether we thought he should say anything or should maintain silence on the subject”. The Panel questioned McClellan on his beliefs in regards to slavery and the war to which he responded “the war would work out the manumission of the slaves gradually...however, that the Proclamation was premature”. Cox stated that he, Burnside, and Cochrane all advised McClellan that “any declaration on his part against the Proclamation would be a fatal error...that any public utterance by him in his official character criticizing the civil policy of the administration would be properly regarded as a usurpation” and even though McClellan agreed, he declared that there were forces at work attempting to thwart the administration by organizing a coup with McClellan as leader of this insurgency. I think what needs to be most emphasized here is that it is extremely plausible that had McClellan decided to march upon Washington and topple Lincoln, that the Army of the Potomac would have followed him. The question that needs to be answered is--- who were these agitators urging McClellan to engage in treason? It can be surmised that John Garrett and William Aspinwall were likely whispering in McClellan's ear. Possibly even John Fitz-Porter. But who were the “others” McClellan referred to when he said “people assured him that the army was so devoted to him that they would as one man enforce any decision he should make as to any part of the war policy”? No doubt McClellan had a huge flair for drama, but in this case I do believe there was a ring of conspirators who were exerting undue pressure on McClellan to make a disloyal move on Washington. (3)


Jacob Cox
(booksfilmandmusic.com)



Ambrose Burnside
(CWT)

Nonetheless, it was discussed that if “there was agitation in camp on the subject, and intrigues of the sort...[was it not] wise for him to say something which would show, at least, that he gave no countenance to any would-be revolutionists”. The Panel agreed that McClellan should release general orders to “remind the army...that whatever might be their rights as citizens, they must as soldiers beware of any organized effort to meddle with the functions of the civil government”. On October 7th, McClellan released General Orders No. 163 which stated the afore mentioned.  (4)



George McClellan
(Wikipedia)

 For whatever reason, Cochrane was so impressed with McClellan and his anti-slavery views that Cochrane ran off to Washington to meet with Chase who Cochrane correctly believed “constituted a central point, to which converged the multifarious strands of the radical web...[and was] a decided and resolute opponent of General McClellan”. Not only did Cochrane wish to change Chase and the Radicals opinions about McClellan, but he also held the bold notion that HE COULD REPLACE HALLECK WITH MCCLELLAN so that he could eliminate the “selfish machinations” that were endangering the successful prosecution of the war. Talk about intrigue! Gotta love Civil War politics! According to Cochrane, upon learning of McClellan’s true views in regards to slavery Chase agreed to reinstate him as the head of all armies. Satisfied that Chase was in his back pocket, Cochrane next took off for the Soldier’s Home to converse with Lincoln on the same subject. Cochrane presented the same argument to the President and claimed Lincoln “answered that the plan had occurred to him, and that it might, perhaps, supply the proper relief for the troubles we were enduring, and avert the dangers which menaced”. Wow! According to Cochrane, this scheme never played out due to McClellan being associated with the Democrats and this party’s open hostility towards the Lincoln administration during the 1862 election. After the election, McClellan found himself out of a job rather than being promoted to the top spot, ouch. (5)

As to what Burnside’s reaction was to this conversation with McClellan, Cox, and Cochrane, it’s hard to say. According to his biographer, Burnside “had actively enforced slave laws to win over uncommitted North Carolinians, [but] Burnside’s observations had convinced him that no amount of such currying would lure the South back into the Union...it would be more effective...to threaten them into a renunciation of secession on the penalty of total emancipation, while implying that slavery might continue (if it could) if the ordinance of secession were revoked”. Other than that, Burnside’s thoughts remain unknown. Unfortunately, I haven’t found any works written by Burnside covering the Maryland Campaign. The Rhode Island Historical Society has the majority of his papers but there is gap spanning June-November 1862. (6)



First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation (Located in Senate wing of US Capitol)

So now I come to the paint brush. In 1864, FB Carpenter lived at the White House for six months. During this time, he set up a canvas in the State Dining Room and painted the First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation by President Lincoln. There are three things associated with this painting that I find to be truly interesting. First, Carpenter chose “not the signing of the final proclamation, but the July 1862 cabinet meeting at which Lincoln first told his ministers that he intended to issue the momentous order”. I think most would assume that this painting depicts the signing but as the title states, it is only the first reading. Second, although Carpenter hugely admired Seward, the painting actually shows Seward objecting “to the issuing of the proclamation until it could be sustained by a Union battlefield victory...the most famous painting ever made of the Emancipation Proclamation thus ironically depicted not its enactment but its postponement”. Bet that nugget of information would make a few modern day crusaders a little red in the face. (7) 

1860 Census Map
(LOC)

Third, and by far the most interesting and completely overlooked, are the two maps made by the United States Coast Survey in the painting. The first map in the lower right corner is the “Map Showing the Distribution of the Slave Population of the Southern States of the United States Compiled From the Census of 1860”. As the longest-ever-title states, this map shows the slave population in the South based on the statistics from the 1860 census. The 1860 census was the last time slaves were counted and this is the first map that shows the distribution of that last count. The amount of slaves per county is illustrated through the light/dark shading. It is abundantly clear where slave populations were highest (Mississippi River region and coastal South Carolina). Ironically, one can count the near order of secession based on the states slave population holdings.  Although there were a plethora of maps available (however, not always accurate), Lincoln chose this map to help with strategic planning since it clearly displayed the Confederacy’s labor system of slavery. It did not go unnoticed by Carpenter that Lincoln constantly referred to this map. Carpenter wrote that he wanted to display the map in his painting so “he carried it off one day, without the President’s knowledge, and as the copying of it was a tedious affair, it remained in the studio for some time...[until] one afternoon the President came in...[and] his eye fell upon the map...[and exclaimed] ‘you have appropriated my map, have you? I have been looking all around for it’”. (8)

 



1863 Map of the State of Virginia
(LOC)

The second map located on the table behind Seward is the US Coast Survey’s 1863 “Map of the State of Virginia”. This map too shares a military element. It displays concentric rings from Richmond outward every 10 miles as well as every rail line and mileage distance by rail.  In addition, all towns and terrain features are prominently displayed. These elements also factored into and guided Union strategy. It’s no surprise that Carpenter featured these two maps in his painting. (9) 

Concentric rings around Richmond




Rail Lines and Mileage

So in this blissful trip of a post I have gone from a New York Representative---who, after the crucial battle of Antietam, was included in a conversation about a newly issued proclamation--- back to an earlier discussion about the same  proclamation, whereby its release depended on that crucial battlefield victory, that later led to a painting---which included two maps that illustrated the Union war strategy that enabled and emboldened the release of the Emancipation Proclamation. I hope you followed along and had as much fun as I did!



Sources---
1. bioguide.congress.gov &  Wikipedia
2. McClellan's War by Ethan Rafuse, 205. Pgs 327-328.
3. Military Reminiscences of the Civil War by Jacob Cox, 1900. Pgs 359-360.
4. Cox pg 361.
5. American Civil War by John Cochrane, 1879. pgs 30-33.
6. Burnside by William Marvel, 1991. Pg 153.
7. Six Months at the White House with Abraham Lincoln by FB Carpenter, ed. by Harold Holzer, 2008. Pgs 8-9.
8. Carpenter pg 234. Notes on maps from 2011 Geography & Map Division (LOC) Civil War Maps Seminar.
9. Notes on maps from 2011 Geography & Map Division (LOC) Civil War Maps Seminar

The "Incomparably Incompetent" Roger A Pryor

The men advanced past a farm, briefly halted, collected themselves and continued on towards the next farm. They stumbled across a small enemy outpost at this farm, to which they easily brushed aside. For most, this was their first encounter with the enemy. So far, so good. Heading still in a southern direction, the men reached a limestone ridge and as they crested it they met a terrific wall of fire that violently erupted from a sunken farm lane teeming with the enemy less than 100 yards away. The enemy had been waiting in this sunken lane and held their fire until the blue silhouettes appeared before them. This initial volley brought down the approaching men “as grain falls before a reaper” and for the next two hours, a savage sanguine fight raged over this strip of depressed terrain once called Hog’s Trough Lane but from thereafter known as the Bloody Lane. (1)

(Roger A Pryor, historycentral.net)

The story of the “incomparably incompetent” Roger A Pryor and his performance at Antietam is a classic example of why politicians should never become military leaders. Pryor was sent to the House of Representatives on December 7, 1859 to fill the vacancy of the deceased William O Goode. Pryor was elected to the 36th Congress in his own right but never took his seat because he resigned March 3, 1861 due to the secession of Virginia. He then served in the Confederate Congress until he entered the Confederate army as a Colonel with the 3rd VA.  He received a promotion to Brigadier General in April 1862 and initially commanded the 2nd FL, 14th AL, 3rd VA, and 14th LA.  Shortly before Antietam, Pryor received two more regiments, 5th & 8th FL, lost the 14th LA, and the brigade became known as the “Florida Brigade”. (2)

(End of Rodes line. Beginning of mixed brigades line to Hagerstown Pike)

In order to understand just how badly Pryor screwed things up, an explanation of what was occurring on the field during this time is necessary. I won’t go into every detail of the fighting at Bloody Lane, that in itself is a dissertation, but a general overview of what was happening on the Confederate line. DH Hill had ordered the brigades of Robert Rodes (3rd, 5th, 6th, 12th, 26th Alabama) and GB Anderson (2nd, 4th, 14th, 30th NC) to form a line in the sunken lane corridor as a rallying point for Hill’s three other brigades (Roswell Ripley, AH Colquitt, and Duncan McRae) who were located on the northern part of the field. Rodes was highly respected and considered to be a rising star (I would call him a total Confederate rock star!) and Anderson, while not as popular, was thought to offer as solid leadership as Rodes did. Both brigades were critically understrength, Rodes due to the severe fighting at South Mountain three days prior, and Anderson from general hard duty over the past summer months. To fill in the 150 yard gap that existed from the end of Rodes’ brigade west to the Hagerstown Pike, was placed pieces of brigades that belonged to Colquitt, McRae, and Howell Cobb. This conglomeration of brigades was commanded by William MacRae. (3)



(Union approach to the sunken lane)



William French’s division was on its (perhaps misguided) way to the sunken lane. This division was freshly reorganized and contained a plethora of new recruits. Brigadier Max Weber advanced to Roulette farm and shortly past it brushed aside a small rebel outpost at the Clipp house (interestingly enough, the house isn’t on any maps) and continued moving south until the brigade reached a limestone ridge. As the yankees crested this ridge, they met a blast of fire from a sunken lane filled to the brim with greybacks less than 100 yards away. Three times French’s division charged only to be bloodily repulsed without breaking Hill’s line. Next up was Richardson’s division. Again, the Union assaulted the rebel line and although casualties mounted, the Confederates held fast. (4)



(Rodes' position)



Rodes held a position which allowed a steady and general fire at the yankees while Anderson’s position was more exposed due to the terrain and thus faced a wider arc of incoming fire. As a result, Anderson’s brigade “followed a common theme...federals appeared at the crest; withering volleys stunned them and sapped their momentum; southern troops launched occasional futile and costly sallies; and then both sides settled down to enervating exchanges of musketry at short range” resulting in a bloody stalemate. Furthermore, “Confederate officers...fell so fast that command and control dissolved”. One of the first officers to fall was Anderson. A minie ball embedded itself in his ankle and he was removed from the field (he died on October 16 due to infection/amputation). Next in command was Colonel Charles C Tew. As Tew lifted his hat to acknowledge his new command, a bullet slammed into his head and killed him instantly. Third in line was Colonel Francis M Parker. As Tew, Parker acknowledged the courier and then took ten steps to the left to have his head meet with a killer bullet. Not a good day to be a Confederate officer. (5)



(CWT Map)



(At 10am RH Anderson's division moved east from Hagerstown Pike, across Piper Farm, and swung in a northerly direction to the sunken lane behind GB Anderson's brigade)

--------------------->>>

At 10am RH Anderson received orders to reinforce Hill’s line. Anderson offered the only reinforcements to be found. Minutes onto the field, Anderson was shot in the thigh and command was transferred to the “incomparably incompetent” Pryor. With Pryor, a tenuous situation was about to take a severe downturn as Pryor “neither knew RH Anderson’s plan nor what to do in the emergency [and] as a result, Pryor’s units filtered into the sunken road by regiments and companies. With Pryor in command, and the loss of officers within the Bloody Lane, there was no one in overall control of the Confederate right”. (6)

(On Hagerstown Pike facing east towards Piper Farm corn and orchard)

Further exacerbating the situation, regimental leadership was in shreds, especially for the Florida regiments in Pryor’s brigade. The Florida brigade “crossed Hagerstown Pike, passed the Piper farmstead, and took position near Piper’s apple orchard...lay prone to avoid unnecessarily exposing themselves to enemy fire” leading to a terse exchange between Rodes and Pryor. Rodes demanded of Captain William D Ballatine to know who they were and why they weren’t fighting. Ballatine informed Rodes that the brigade belonged to Pryor and that they had no orders to move, to advance, or for that matter, to do anything. Rodes immediately found Pryor to let him know his brigade was “behaving badly”. Pryor ordered the Florida brigade (2nd, 8th, 5th FL, 3rd VA, 14th AL) forward and it moved through Piper’s cornfield to the sunken road behind the 14th and 4th NC. Colonel RT Bennett stated in his after-action report that “word came for the command to keep lookout on the extreme right. While directing ourselves to that point, masses of Confederate troops in great confusion were seen...coming to our succor, broke beyond the power of rallying after five minutes’ stay”. In what Bennett labeled as the “stampede”, was the accidental order of a withdraw which caused the Confederate line to retreat and run. One of Rodes’ officers had shifted a company to meet the enemy on the left but an error in orders caused a withdraw instead and caused the whole line to collapse as the Union responded by flanking and enfilading the rebel defenses. Pryor’s scattered division was caught in the melee and retreated back through the Piper farm. (7)



In my search for information and primary sources in regards to Pryor’s Florida brigade and his extremely short command of RH Anderson’s brigade, I found next to nothing to put the pieces together. There are several collections of letters held at various Florida agencies that I couldn’t get to. Possibly, if I had the time I could have located rosters of the regiments filling RH Anderson’s division and then scoured the Library of Congress for diaries and journals, maybe I will at a later date. As far as after-action reports for RH Anderson’s division at Bloody Lane, there is only one report. In fact, in a footnote in Carman/Clemens it is stated “Anderson’s division poses a special problem in terms of gathering information about their role in the battle of Antietam. Anderson was wounded while marching toward the Sunken Road; neither he nor Gen Roger Pryor who eventually assumed command, wrote an after action report. None of the six brigade commanders wrote reports, and of the 26 regiments in the division, only one commander wrote a report”. (8)

The one report is by Captain Abram M Feltus of the 16th MS and seems to me to be the tip of the iceberg for a reassessment of Anderson’s brigade and what it contributed to the fight at Bloody Lane. A rather long but worthy quote from Feltus---“About 10am, being ordered to advance in the direction of the enemy, did so in good order...passing by a large barn, we proceeded, under a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms, several hundred yards further...confronted the enemy in line of battle, who were drawn up some 300 yards from the road, pouring a destructive fire in our ranks...this regiment gallantly held its position until ordered to retire, which it did in as good order as could be expected from its thinned ranks. When we retired as far as the road. A scene of great confusion ensued from the mingling together of different brigades. We continued to fall back until we reached the barn...in this position we advanced again upon the enemy, and met them in the corn-field beyond the barn. Here, after a desperate fight, we fell back, by orders, to our original position, on account of the terrific cross-fire of the enemy’s batteries”. This report clearly descibes a different situation than the one by Bennett. In Waters & Edmonds, there are several mentions of bravery as well as pointing out that RH Anderson’s division went with the flow of battle based on what Rodes’ and GT Anderson’s brigades were doing RATHER THAN RH Anderson’s division being the cause of confusion due to Pryor's ineptitude and poor deployment of reinforcements. (9)

1. Robert K Krick, "'It Appeared As Though Mutual Extermination Would Put a Stop to the Awful Carnage:' Confederates in Sharpsburg's Bloody Lane," in The Antietam Campaign ed. Gary W Gallagher, 1999. Pgs 230-233.

2. bioguide.congress.gov & historycentral.net.

3. Krick pgs 224-228.

4. Krick pgs 230-231. A Small but Spartan Band by Zack C Waters & James C Edmonds, 2010. Pg 33.

5. Krick pgs 236-237.

6.  Waters & Edmonds pg 33.

7. Waters & Edmonds pgs 34-37. TR Bennett Official Report.

8. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol 2: Antietam by Ezra Carman, ed Thomas G Clemens, 2012. Pg 257 Footnote #31.

9. Abram M Feltus Official Report.

A Dead General

Just minutes before, the Federals had been pushed back off the field to what would become known as Burnside Bridge. The General, his attention directed to a certain portion of the field, was conferring with two other Generals while in the act of raising his field glasses to his eyes. In the next instant, an enemy shot made its mark and ripped into the General’s face, killing him instantly.

AP Hill received his summons around 630am on September 17^th to hurry and join Lee at Sharpsburg. Hill began the dusty 17 mile march from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg by 7am. The sounds of battle were heard the entire length of the journey. Hill’s men crossed Boteler’s Ford at Sheperdstown around 2pm and were soon spotted for the large dust cloud they kicked up as they advanced to the battlefield. There was a tense moment of confusion... they were proudly wearing their “new” blue uniforms... but then the Confederates flags of Hill’s division were seen flying in the columns.  The forced march left the soldiers exhausted but there was no time for rest as the situation on the Confederate right was in dire straits...

                 (Confederate line along the western edge of the cornfield)

Hill, not wasting time sorting out the columns, immediately deployed his division along Harpers Ferry Road between 340-4pm as the brigades arrived. (1)





(Nice map by NPS)



Archer, Branch, and Gregg threw their brigades into the fray and battled Harland’s brigade (4^th Rhode Island, 8^th & 16^th Connecticut). Initially, Gregg’s 1^st & 12^th SC assaulted the 16^th CT and 4^th RI in a cornfield while the 8^th CT wandered off (into what should have turned into a suicide mission but somehow they survived their little journey).


(the wandering 8th CT monument)

 As Gregg traded punches with the Federals, Branch’s brigade (minus the 18^th NC being held in reserve) arrived on the field and focused their attention on the wandering 8^th CT’s exposed left flank. After ten minutes of steady fire from the 7^th & 37^th NC, the 8^th CT defiantly waved their flag at the North Carolinians and retreated back to the safety of Rodman’s division. In the meantime, Gregg ordered the 1^st SC Rifles forward as the other Palmetto soldiers were wavering due to a lack of ammunition. The 1^st SC Rifles crept up on the flank of the 4^th RI which caused this regiment and the 16^th CT to flee the field. Minutes later, Archer brought his tiny brigade onto the field to duel against Ewing’s Buckeyes. Archer’s men didn’t last long against the effective fire from the Ohioans who were hiding behind a stone wall. However, Gregg’s 12^th SC snuck a flank attack causing Ewing’s brigade to quickly relocate as the advanced position could not be held. (2)

(16th CT monument facing Confederate line and cornfield)

Prior to all this havoc, and minutes after he positioned the 18^th NC in its reserve position, Branch rode over to Gregg and Archer to observe the Union position. As the small group huddled, Branch raised his field glasses for a closer look. While doing so, a bullet ripped through his face (cheek or jaw, I’ve read both) killing him instantly. All reports have stated the shot came from a sharpshooter but what exactly does that mean? I will admit I am unfamiliar with how far a rifle could have spit out a bullet but I have looked at the ground where the bullet most likely came from and the shooter would have to have been hanging out in a tree. I can’t imagine anyone in a tree would have made it out alive considering the the amount of action in that area. In addition, the ground on that portion of the battlefield is quite uneven and rough. Supposedly, Branch was on a spot of raised ground but that would require some seriously good timing on the part of the shooter as well as nerves of steel to just hang in a tree and wait to see if he could get a good catch. Furthermore, no one ever claimed the kill. This is a bit unusual since in most accounts that I have read, a shooter who hits a high value target typically claims his work. Why did the shooter not claim the kill? Not even a whisper as to what regiment the shot may have come from. Strange. (3)

Lawrence O'Bryan Branch

However, I have read one account that states a Union volley from 40 yards away was responsible for the fatal bullet. In Robert Krick’s essay about Maxcy Gregg, Krick states that “Gregg was fortunate to have escaped so lightly, for the volley that hit him was apparently the same fire that had inflicted a mortal wound on Gregg’s fellow brigadier L. O’Bryan Branch”. He cites two sources for this statement, a memoir by Alexander Cheves Haskell and a letter to Ezra Carman also by Haskell. The memoir says nothing to suggest that Gregg and Branch were wounded at the same time. I’m still searching for the letter. (4)

It is believed Branch was removed from the battlefield by his slave, Wiley. His remains were then transported to Raleigh and on September 27 were laid in state in the rotunda of the capitol until the next morning when Branch was interred at the City Cemetery. It is also believed that not such a large gathering of people had been in Raleigh since 1844 when Henry Clay visited. (5)

This outpouring was due to his popularity as a North Carolinian and as a US Representative. Branch was born in Enfield, North Carolina in 1828. He attended several colleges, graduated from Princeton, and studied under Salmon Chase in Washington DC. In 1840 Branch moved to Florida where he practiced law and fought in the Seminole War. Twelve years later, he returned to North Carolina and continued on as a lawyer until 1854 when he was elected as a Representative to the US Congress from North Carolina’s 4^th district and served three terms. Once North Carolina seceded, Branch offered his services and was appointed quartermaster and paymaster of the Tar Heel’s soldiers. He became colonel of the 33^rd in May 1861 and was promoted to brigadier in November 1861. He was in command of New Berne environs until the city fell to Burnside in March 1862. Branch was then assigned a brigade in AP Hill’s Light Division until his death at Antietam. Of Branch, Hill wrote “the Confederacy has to mourn the loss of a gallant soldier and accomplished gentleman, who fell in battle at the head of his brigade”, and Lee further stated “the brave and lamented Brig. Gen. L.O’.B Branch was killed, gallantly leading his brigade”, while one of his beloved soldiers of the 33^rd said his brigade “idolized him. He died as a soldier would wish to die, facing the enemy, in the discharge of his duty”. (6)

Something I found very interesting as I read all the Official Reports and some diaries from the men who fought in this section of the battlefield was the continuous mention of corn. Today, we know this corn as the 40-Acre Cornfield but to the guys running around the field in 1862 it was known as a severe pain in the ass as it truly hampered operations. Some quotes about corn---

LCol Joseph Curtis- “from here the regiment was ordered...to form in line in a corn-field, and to move to support the 16^th CT, which lay in a deep valley between two hills planted with corn...it [was] almost impossible to dress the line, which an advance in line of battle across two fields of full-grown corn had slightly deranged”.

And even worse situation for Curtis----the 4^th RI was “subjected to sharp musketry fire from the front...the enemy showed the national flag (the corn concealing their uniforms)...the order to cease firing was given...to ascertain who was in our front”.

And again more corn issues---“the regiment commenced the movement (retreat) in an orderly manner, but, under the difficulty of keeping closed up in a corn-field...the regiment broke”. (7)

Col Edward Harland---“the right of the enemy’s lines, which was concealed in the edge of the corn-field, opened fire. Our men (16^th CT) returned the fire and advanced, but were forced to fall back. Colonel Beach rallied them and returned them to the attack, but they were driven back, this time out of the corn-field...they were again rallied, but as it was impossible to see the enemy...they could not be held”. (8)

Col Daniel Hamilton---The 1^st SC “was thrown forward, and, pressing on over fences and every obstacle, reached a high ridge in a corn-field to find a large force (for my regiment to contend with) moving down upon me and endeavoring to seek such concealment in the corn-field would enable them to surprise me, but my gallant regiment were too fully alive to the importance of the position which they held, and commenced a deadly fire upon the enemy in the corn-field”. (9)

Lt JFJ Caldwell---“the 14^th [SC] regiment was posted behind a low stone fence...below us stretched a wide field of luxuriant corn...into the cornfield, the 1^st, 12^th, and 13^th regiments were advanced in a line of battle...and soon engaged the Federal line moving through the corn”.

A short while later---“the firing during this period, which was about an hour, was as rapid as possible, and on our side unusually accurate. So dense was the corn that the lines sometimes approached within thirty or forty yards of each other before opening”. (10)

Capt Wolcott Pascal Marsh---The 8^th CT “now returned fire & the men went to their work as coolly as if on drill. But we were trapped on our left flank was a large corn field & it was full of rebels on our right was a high hill where they were pouring in a gauling upon us & all this beside those in our front. Where was our support. Where was the the first brigade none of them to be seen on the right where they had gone. Where was the 16^th & 4^th who were on left & were to engage the rebels in the corn field. Alas! They had been repulsed. It was death to remain in this advanced position longer”. (11)

Corp George Allen---“on our [4^th RI] advance into that bloody cornfield no one seemed to know the position of the rebel forces, whether in our front, flank, or rear. The 16^th CT, as we were advancing to support them, broke, and came crowding in a confused mob upon our right, and confusion reigned preeminent for awhile. The enemy now poured in a steady fire of musketry, and breasting this storm of lead as best we could, we returned their fire, when suddenly the order was given, ‘cease firing, you are firing upon your own men’. We looked, and there above us on the hill were the Stars and Stripes, the top of which we could just see over the top of the corn. The firing upon our part ceased, and, as stated, it was but a ruse of the enemy to draw us into a trap”. (12)

Who knew corn was so dangerous???

1. Cape Fear Confederates: the 18^th North Carolina regiment in the Civil War. James Gillispie, 2012. Pgs 108-109.

2. The Maps of Antietam. Bradley Gottfried, 2012. Pgs 224-229.

3. 37^th North Carolina troops: Tar Heels in the Army of Northern Virginia. Michael Hardy, 2003. Pg 100.

4. Smoothbore Volley that Doomed the Confederacy. Robert Krick, 2002. Pgs 164-165.

5. 37^th North Carolina troops: Tar Heels in the Army of Northern Virginia. Michael Hardy, 2003. Pg 100.

6. 37^th North Carolina troops: Tar Heels in the Army of Northern Virginia. Michael Hardy, 2003. Pg 109.  
CivilWarInteractive./biographies/bioslawrenceobryanbranch.htm

7. OR

8. OR

9. OR

10. History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, first known as “Gregg’s” and subsequently as “McGowan’s Brigade. JFJ Caldwell (Edited by Lee A Wallace Jr), 1992. Pgs 76-77.

11. Letters to a Civil War Bride: the Civil War Letters of Captain Wolcott Pascal Marsh. Compiled by Sandra Marsh Mercer & Jerry Mercer, 2006. Pgs 470-471 without corrections.

12. Forty-Six Months with the Fourth Rhode Island Volunteers. Corp. George H. Allen, 1887. Pg 146.

Havoc in Hagerstown, 1860's Style!

On this day, Thursday September 10th, 150 years ago, it was no secret that the Army of Northern Virginia was roaming the Maryland landscape. Although their exact location might yet remain elusive to some, it was no longer a mystery for the citizens of Hagerstown. The reality of the situation came crashing through the streets in the form of the 1st VA Cavalry. It was on this day that the local newspaper, Herald of Freedom and Torch Light (phew, what a name!) smartly packed up and relocated to Chambersburg for the next two weeks. The staff was in the process of setting the typeset for the September 10th edition when it was decided that it was time to go! The next day hundreds more also fled into Pennsylvania as Longstreet’s Division poured into Hagerstown. For those who stayed behind, they found themselves up to their ears in worthless Confederate money or certificates of indebtedness used to pay for every type of good imaginable. The rebels were described as “not only badly clothed and unclean in person, but in a half-starving condition... hundreds are weakened by diarrhea, and worn out by their long march...many express an ardent desire to lay down their arms”.

It was noted that the army had two camps, on the southeast and southwest of town, and remained there until the morning of Sunday the 14th when it began a retrograde movement. By Monday morning all rebels had vacated Hagerstown but the citizens were left in a state of uncertainty. Where did the rebels go and were they coming back? Who could tell? It was an 1860’s edge of the seat nail-biter! And just when the tension became absolutely unbearable “a company of U. S. Regular Cavalry, under Lieut. Tarleton, came charging into town and were received with wild and enthusiastic applause and our town was restored to the shadow of the Stars and Stripes, and to comparative quiet and security. In a very few minutes the Star Spangled Banner which had for days been hidden was thrown flaunting to the breeze, and hearts grew glad and voices loud, amid the exultant joy which filled the public breast”. Happy Hagerstown citizens!

The editors and staff returned to Hagerstown on September 24th and continued on with the typeset and finished pages 2, 3, and 4 of the September 10th edition. What’s remarkable is the change in tone from page 1 to page 2-3. Pre-invasion vs post-invasion mentality. Page 1 has war news which includes an article on Bragg’s army and an interesting op-ed from  ‘A Union Man Who Loves TRUTH’ about how the media distorts the war. Hmm, sound familiar?  Pages 2-3 include lengthy pieces about the rebel slumber party in Hagerstown as well as the battles of Harper’s Ferry, South Mountain and Antietam. Other than the small segment about an escaped boa constrictor, I think the best part of the the September 10-24th edition is from the editors, who wrote-----

SUSPENSION OF THE HERALD AND TORCH.—

When the rebels approached Hagerstown we, in company with hundreds of other Union men, sought refuge in Pennsylvania, and consequently the publication of the Herald and Torch was suspended for two weeks. It was the first time during the twenty-three years we have had control of this paper, that we failed to issue it upon the regular day of publication, and under the circumstances, we presume no subscriber will be ungenerous enough to censure us for deserting our post. We can print no paper under rebel rule, and this is our apology for printing none while that rule extended over Washington County. We have again returned to our sanctum, but being short of hands, and having passed through a week of intense anxiety and excitement, we are unable to do justice to this number of the paper. It was, indeed, with great difficulty that we managed to issue a paper at all, and we must therefore ask the forbearance of our patrons until we can get fairly under way again.

The September 10-24th edition of the Herald of Freedom & Torch Light can be found at www.whilbr.org (Western Maryland's Historical Library).

*Any factual errors are based on what the editors knew then rather than what I know now.

Another Representative at War--- William Barksdale

Representative William Barksdale of Mississippi resigned from the 36th Congress to join the Mississippi Militia. He entered the state’s militia as an adjutant general after Mississippi seceded and just prior to the outbreak of war.  He quickly rose in rank to quartermaster and then brigadier general on March 1, 1861.  Two months later Barksdale was appointed colonel of the 13th Mississippi in the CSA. In June 1862 Barksdale assumed command of Richard Griffith’s brigade after Griffith was killed at the Battle of Malvern Hill. Barksdale was promoted to Brigadier General on August 12, 1862 and from then on his brigade (13th, 17th, 18th, 21st) was known as Barksdale’s Mississippi Brigade.



Barksdale
(Google Images)


During the Maryland Campaign, Barksdale was in Major General Lafayette McLaws’ division (Longstreet Corps ANV). Although at this time I will not be focusing on Harpers Ferry operations, it must be stated that Barksdale was engaged there and his was one of the brigades that attacked Maryland Heights. Instead, I will focus on Barksdale’s performance at Antietam as his brigade was crucial in saving the Confederate left flank against Major General John Sedgwick’s attack in the West Woods.

So I briefly go back to Harpers Ferry to put things in perspective. By the night of September 16,  Harper’s Ferry had surrendered and Lee had decided to remain in Maryland and offer battle to McClellen at Sharpsburg. McLaws had earlier received orders to hurry along to catch up with the rest of the Confederate Army at Sharpsburg. McLaws faced a host of problems, primarily moving his division across clogged bridges and through congested streets, not to mention his soldiers were tired and hungry. At 11am McLaws let his men rest but by 3pm, when an order from Lee urging McLaws to hurry arrived, they grudgingly got up and began moving again. The division marched along Sheperdstown Road until around 9pm when it reached a point 2 miles from Boteler’s Ford and made camp. Around 11pm a second order came from Lee that in no uncertain terms stated McLaws was due at Sharpsburg immediately. At 4am McLaws reached Sharpsburg and searched for Lee. He found Longstreet, then Jackson, and finally Lee. Lee directed McLaws to keep his division posted on Sheperdstown Road and allow his men to rest until they were needed. Meanwhile, McLaws swan-dived into the tall grass along the road and took a nap.



McLaws
(Google Images)



Although the battle of Antietam opened around 530am, McLaws’ division did not engage until 9am. At 8am Jubal Early sent a dire request for reinforcements to Jackson and in turn Jackson made an appeal to Lee. Lee called up McLaws' division still resting along Shepardstown Road. During this hour, events in the West Woods were to become cataclysmic. Early had returned to his brigade and surveyed the situation.



125th PA



He saw the 125th Pennsylvania which “had gotten detached from its brigade, and all alone it was advancing in splendid ignorance down the Smoketown Road, a journey that, because of the sharp angle the road took in the East Woods, was carrying the regiment toward the Dunkard Church” placing them past Early’s right flank. Early observed Union artillery on the Dunker plateau facing the town which threatened to cut off Early from the town and the rest of the Confederate army. Early watched the beginnings of Sedgwick’s division emerge from the East Woods and head in his direction. Quite an hour!



34th NY


In response to this series of threats, Early snuck his brigade south behind Hauser’s Ridge and swung left to face east and open fire on those near the Dunker Church. Two of Sedgwick’s brigades, Gorman and Dana, entered the West Woods on Early’s left. Another wandering regiment, Gorman’s 34th NY, went astray and ended up taking position with the 125th PA at Dunker Church. This mistake would prove to be costly because it left a 300 yard gap between the left flank of Gorman’s brigade and the nearest Union regiment, the 15th MA. Even more worrisome was had the 34th NY been in the right place it would have filled a ravine in the West Woods that extended the length of the woods to Hagerstown Pike. Where the regiment currently stood, the ravine was neither noticed nor occupied by the 34th NY.  Just then, Early noticed reinforcements headed his way marching up Hagerstown Pike. However, Early also realized that if he continued his attack in an eastward direction then a case of friendly fire would occur. As Early attempted to call off the attack, the 125th PA and 34th NY realized the overextended pickle they were in and retreated and Early’s brigade gave chase. Early watched Sedgwick’s third brigade (Howard) enter the West Woods, regained control of his own brigade and moved them back to Hauser’s Ridge and did not participate in the fury of McLaws’ division smashing into Sedgwick’s division.



West Woods




A map that illustrates just how confusing the situation in the West Woods was.
(courtesy of CWT)

 As McLaws advanced up Hagerstown Pike he put his division in order (Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes) to the left/west. Cobb wandered too far off to the right and was lost from this part of the battle’s action. McLaws noticed one of Sedgwick’s brigade entering the West Woods and assumed he would cross the open ground near Dunker Church and enter the woods catching the enemy unaware. McLaws stated “as the enemy were filling the woods so rapidly, I wished my troops to cross the open space between us and the woods before they were entirely occupied”. What he didn’t factor in was the 125th PA and 34th NY yet meandering about the church. Kershaw’s brigade attacked first. He pulled his brigade to the right in order to avoid the friendly fire scenario that had worried Early and inadvertently ended on the east side of Hagerstown Pike in the sights of the line of Union artillery. According to Kershaw, he “ordered forward, at double-quick, Colonel Kennedy’s 2nd South Carolina Regiment to march by a flank to the extreme point of the wood; then by front to enter it. Before the head of the regiment had reached the point, and when entangled in a rail fence, the enemy opened fire upon them from a point not more than 60 yards distant. They promptly faced to the front, and returned the fire so rapidly as to drive the enemy almost immediately. At the same time the brigades of Cobb (Kershaw meant Semmes) and Barksdale, now on their left, advanced to their support”. In the meanwhile, Semmes went off on a rescue mission and, just like Early, used Hauser’s Ridge to mask his movements as he snuck his brigade north to deal with Sedgwick’s front. With Cobb located at Sunken Lane, Kershaw halted on the east side of Hagerstown Pike, and Semmes forming a line in front of Hauser’s Ridge, McLaws had only Barksdale left.



Hauser's Ridge


Initially, things did not look to bode any better for Barksdale. In his Official Report, Barksdale noted “that a portion of men had fallen by the wayside from loss of sleep and excessive fatigue, having been constantly on duty for five or six days, and on march for almost the whole of the two preceding nights, and that I went into the fight with less than 800 men”. He formed a line of battle at 1000am and followed Kershaw in pursuit of the 125th PA and 34th NY but when he came under fire from the north Barksdale “discovered that a very large force of the enemy were attempting to flank me on the left. I therefore ordered the Eighteenth and Thirteenth to wheel in that direction, and not only succeeded in checking the movement they were making, but put them to flight”.  These two regiments, along with Semmes and the supporting brigade of GT Anderson unleashed a devastating fire along the Union lines. The men of Sedgwick’s division fled from the West Woods to the safety of the North and East Woods.



Battlefield Tablet
No. 357

 In his Official Report, McLaws stated “Brigadier-Generals Kershaw, Semmes, and Barksdale deserve high praise for their heroic conduct in the fight and for the skillful manner their brigades were handled”. Clearly, a man of few words.

***Sources***
Joseph Harsh "Taken at the Flood" pgs 364-392.
Marion Armstrong "Unfurl Those Colors" pg 184.
Official Reports of Lafayette McLaws, William Barksdale, Jubal Early, Paul Semmes, Willis Gorman, Joseph Kershaw.